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Ex-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi once famously claimed that the “evasion
of high taxes was a God-given right” (Bhatti et al. 2012). Reports from Istat,
Corte dei Conti, and l’Agenzia delle Entrate estimate that tax evasion in Italy
costs the state €120 billion per year in lost revenue (Santoro 2010). Using data
from the Istituto nazionale di statistica (Istat), Alessandro Santoro demon-
strates that evasion of value added tax (VAT) averages about 34 percent across
regions (Santoro 2010). Figure 5.1 shows evasion rates for the regional tax on
production.1
One explanation for relatively sluggish and asymmetric development in
Italy argues that Southern Italy is drivingmost of these ills. This line of inquiry
depicts Southern Italians as less endowed with civic virtue and social capital,
which is reflected in their lower levels of economic development and, as
shown in Table 5.1, government performance (Banfield 1967; Bigoni et al.
2016; Cartocci 2006; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994; Sabatini 2005a;
2005b). Here civic virtue is defined as high civic awareness and a shared
consensus regarding the legitimacy of political institutions and public policy,
together with political competence and trust (Almond and Verba 1963). Social
capital refers to features of social life, such as networks and trust, that facilitate
civic participation (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994).
This line of research typically associates development to the cultural under-
pinnings of society. Edward Banfield followed by Robert Putnam and his
colleagues suggest that Southern Italy is a region characterized by amoral
familism. Societies tied by amoral familism (bonding social capital) “empha-
size family relations to the exclusion of all others” (Fukuyama 1995).
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A centuries-old debate about the Italian character would have us believe the
Italian “character is faulty, and that this faultiness even explains much of
the social and political problems of their country today” (Patriarca 2010: 5).
Indeed, Europeans perceive Italians as the least trustworthy of Western Euro-
pean nations (Mackie 2001).2 In this framework, ethical behavior is thus
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Figure 5.1. Rates of evasion of IRAP by region 1998–2002
Source: Istat in Santoro (2010).
Table 5.1. Quality of government: 14 Western European countries
Country Quality Impartiality Corruption Average
Finland 1.657 1.296 1.266 1.406
Netherlands 0.956 1.445 0.912 1.104
Denmark 0.723 1.004 1.560 1.096
Ireland 0.705 1.046 1.252 1.001
United Kingdom 0.507 0.797 0.871 0.725
Sweden 0.030 1.128 0.897 0.665
Belgium 1.440 0.229 0.054 0.422
Germany 0.265 0.322 0.651 0.413
Austria 0.320 0.133 0.359 0.270
Italy 0.187 0.187 0.634 0.087
Spain 0.083 0.229 0.115 0.087
France 0.210 0.758 0.074 0.158
Portugal 0.259 0.848 0.745 0.617
Greece 1.287 0.655 1.304 1.082
Source: Nationally representative public opinion surveys were conducted by The Quality of
Government Institute about perceptions of local education, health, and law enforcement
institutions. Researchers asked participants to rate each of the three institutions on quality,
impartiality, and corruption. For more information, see Teorell et al. 2011.
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confined to the immediate family and closest friends. By siphoning money
from the breadwinner, paying taxes, which benefits society at large, can be
perceived as hurting the familial unit by imposing a cost coming out of their
earnings that will indirectly benefit someone outside the familial unit, rather
than directly benefiting themselves.
Nevertheless, the amoral familism argument has been met by a litany of
critics, who argue that the social capital literature often confounds explan-
ations with outcomes, which implies that public institutions and the elites
that govern those institutions are somehow responsible for fostering a civic
citizenry. For example, Levi suggests that a government’s ability to protect
property rights and a merit-based society (one opposed to the clientelism or
nepotism found in Southern Italy) instill a generalized trust in society (Levi
1996). Even Putnam mentions in Making Democracy Work that the regimes
prior to unification intensified distrust and vertical ties in the South, but he
barely mentions how unification reduced the South to “semi-colonial status”
and “its fragile commercial sector brutally merged with the North’s more
flourishing economy, a uniform tax system and customs union imposed on
its vulnerable industries, and brigandage rooted out by a full-scale military
campaign” (Tarrow 1996: 394). Filippo Sabetti contends that the growth of
institutions and ecclesial infrastructure since the eighteenth century better
explain the Italian political economy than the amoral familism stressed by
Putnam.
Like these critics, I contend that the moralist argument fails to account for
the institutional environment (such as a period of progressive politics, polit-
ical competition, or strife between the Church and the state) from which
behavior may manifest. While the vast majority of these scholars analyze
economic and social development, I am concerned with why tax compliance
is so low across Italy. Simply put, tax behavior reflects the quality of and
perceptions about the government institutions to which a taxpayer is contrib-
uting. I argue that Italian tax compliance has evolved within a low-efficiency/
low-trust equilibrium environment or what Bergman (2009) calls a low-
compliance environment. There is ample evidence in the literature suggesting
that individuals are more likely to pay taxes if they believe that their govern-
ment is honest and efficient (Cummings et al. 2009; Edlund 1999; Frey and
Feld 2002; Frey and Torgler 2007; Levi 1989; Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009;
Pommerehne, Hart, and Frey 1994; Scholz and Lubell 1998; Smith 1992;
Smith and Stalans 1991; Torgler and Schneider 2007). Taxation mobilizes
citizens to demand accountability from their government, but on the other
hand, a lack of government accountability can actually have the opposite effect,
motivating individuals to evade their responsibilities (Huntington 2012; Paler
2013). According to Ross (2004: 234), “[b]oth the size of the tax burden, and the
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quality and quantity of government spending matter; citizens ultimately care
about the ‘price’ they pay for the government services they receive.”
It is no wonder that tax evasion is so rampant in Italy; Italy consistently
ranks near the bottom on the Quality of Government index compared to
other European nations (see Table 5.2). However, Italy’s 44 percent tax burden
(the ratio of tax revenue to gross domestic product (GDP)) is one of the highest
in the European Union; only Denmark, Belgium, France, and Sweden have a
higher tax burden (European Commission and Eurostat 2012). It is possible
then that Italians live in an institutional environment that legitimizes tax
evasion. If Europeans have come to think of Italians as dishonest and Italians
themselves have come to agree, this may be a byproduct of this low-efficiency/
low-trust equilibrium. Because confidence in public institutions is a direct
reflection of the quality of those institutions, clearly Italians should have far
less trust in their public institutions than Swedes (see Jenny Jansson, Chapter 3
in this volume). I suggest that, consequently, Italians aremore likely to cheat on
their taxes and avoid funding public institutions.
The particular tax compliance environment from which tax behavior is
derived is one of government instability, bureaucratic complexity, and admin-
istrative inertia. Italian unification pitted the state against the Catholic
Table 5.2. Quality of government: Italian regions
Region Quality Region score Rank
Trento 1.043 1.981 41
Valle d’Acosta 0.653 1.603 82
Friuli-Venezia 0.373 1.331 109
Veneto 0.186 0.788 146
Emilia-Romagna 0.217 0.757 149
Umbria 0.495 0.488 168
Toscana 0.495 0.450 170
Marche 0.535 0.448 172
Lombardia 0.542 0.442 174
Piemonte 0.652 0.335 182
Liguria 0.848 0.144 190
Abruzzo 1.097 0.097 200
Sardegna 1.307 0.302 204
Basilicata 1.423 0.414 208
Lazio 1.512 0.500 211
Sicilia 1.588 0.575 213
Puglia 1.604 0.590 216
Molise 1.6609 0.645 220
Calabria 1.687 0.671 222
Campania 2.242 1.210 232
Source: Nationally representative public opinion surveys were conducted by The
Quality of Government Institute about perceptions of local education, health, and
law enforcement institutions. Researchers asked participants to rate each of the
three institutions on quality, impartiality, and corruption. For more information,
see Teorell et al. 2011. Southern regions are in bold.
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Church and the North against the South. After a relatively short period of
asymmetric state-building, Italians found themselves fighting in World War
I for a country that was still greatly divided. Citizens’ disaffection with the
political system and a sharp economic downturn led to the rise of Benito
Mussolini, Italian Fascism, and another world war. Since World War II, Italy
has sustained a relatively high level of prosperity, despite major political
turmoil such as right- and left-wing political terrorism in the 1970s; a large
corruption scandal in which half of parliament was charged with corruption
in the 1980s; and sixty-three governments since the “First Republic.” The
political and institutional instability in Italy has led to a profound distrust of
government, and alongside that, an unwillingness to contribute to the state
through taxation.
In the following sections, I examine these issues, focusing on the ways in
which specific timing and institutions have shaped this low-efficiency/
low-trust equilibrium. I trace the ways in which unification pitted the North
against the South, providing a different experience with the state in the
two regions and hence different preferences regarding taxation. Furthermore,
I argue that post-unification (1900–22) political instability fostered a deep
distrust amongst Italians toward their political institutions, shaping a general
political ideology that saw excessive taxes as an infringement of individual
rights. This overarching political ideology curtailed the ability of successive
administrations to create efficient and effective tax regimes.
This was then followed by a series of short-lived prime ministers, which led
to the rise of Fascism (1929), followed by World War II, furthering Italian
political discontent. Following World War II, a deep distrust of government
shaped the new constitution, making tax collection an arduous task for the
administration. Although the 1960s and 1970s can be characterized by unpre-
cedented economic growth in Italy, much of it was fueled by clientelism and
corruption, which in many ways contributed to tax evasion. Moreover, many
in a series of major tax reforms implemented in 1972 to support the modern
state were undermined by an overburdened judicial system, followed by a
reliance on tax amnesties. Finally, the 1990s tax reforms attempted to address
Italy’s extremely large small-business and self-employed sector—one of the
largest drivers of evasion. But those reforms were also watered down by the
immense power of that sector weakening the administration’s ability to col-
lect taxes. In sum, I argue that unstable political institutions, such as a weak
parliament unable to garner confidence and a constitution that protects the
taxpayer at the expense of efficient administrative capabilities, beginning
with unification, fostered a profound distrust of the state, which hindered
the state’s ability to collect taxes.
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The Risorgimento and Italian Politics
In this section, I argue that the Risorgimento resulted in deep divides between
the North and the South, which greatly affected citizens’ willingness to pay
taxes. Elites extracted a disproportionate amount of tax from the South to
fund the development of the North, engraining a deep-seated distrust of the
newly formed nation state in the South. The dominant ideology shaping the
fiscal apparatus of the state reflected a great distrust in state power and
intrusion. Tax collection thus was perceived to be a form of encroachment
on individual rights, dampening the ability of the administration to collect
taxes. By the end of the nineteenth century, interplay between the major
political parties further shaped the tax environment. The Catholic Church
and right-wing liberals joined forces in the North, where there was a strong
industrial labor base, to organize mass political engagement in direct compe-
tition to the socialists. Catholic, right-wing, and socialist organizations made
conscious efforts to build effective and efficient public institutions in order to
garner support for their political movements; these institutions promoted a
high-compliance environment in the North. On the other hand, the South,
populated by mainly peasants, lacked any kind of industrial base and became
disengaged with civic and associational life, leading to a low-compliance
environment.
The Risorgimento (Resurgence) refers to a period of political consolidation
in Italy from 1815 to 1871, ultimately culminating in Italian unification.
Although the Risorgimento led to formally ratified political unification, it
left the country divided between North and South, economically and politic-
ally. As Clark notes, the state imposed an unprecedented tax burden in the
South at the time of unification, which funded the development of the North.
The South made up only 27 percent of GDP, but 32 percent of the tax base,
while the North generated 48 percent of national wealth and paid only
40 percent of the nation’s taxes (Mack Smith 1997: 81).3 Due to a much larger
agricultural base in the South, higher taxes on grain disproportionately
affected the South, while the North benefited the most from public spending.
Since bread was a staple of the Southern Italian diet, increased taxes on grain
also hit Southern peasants the hardest (Carter 2010: 211). The North’s polit-
ical dominance meant that it controlled decisions on taxation and public
spending, which favored citizens in the North and extracted important
resources through taxation from the South, exacerbating the North–South
economic divide. For example, between 1862 and 1897, 455 million lire was
spent on landfills in Northern and Central Italy, while only 3 million lire
was spent on such resources in the South. The majority of school and railway
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spending was also concentrated in the North. Development in the South
certainly suffered after unification, and, as a result, so did the Southerners’
relationship to the newly formed state. Figure 5.2 illustrates the rapid decline
in Southern (Mezzogiorno) per capita income as a percentage of Northern per
capita income after the Risorgimento. These differences in economic develop-
ment, investment, and taxation led to a sense of unfairness and distrust in the
South, and hence to less willingness to pay taxes.
As the South was becoming further separated from the North economically,
there was an important debate taking place regarding the fiscal state. Italy’s
history with foreign occupation instilled a sense of distrust of state power,
which shaped the structure of fiscal institutions. It was thought that the
government should never collect more than 5 percent to 10 percent of gross
national product in taxes; the fiscal system would be based upon private
rights, not public, and a system of laws, not authority; furthermore, the tax
system would first and foremost respect the fundamental right of property.
This last idea severely hampered the administration’s ability to put together a
land registry and has had long-lasting effects on the capacity of revenue
officials to collect taxes, especially from the self-employed and entrepreneurs
(Manestra 2010).
However, claims that the tax burden was too high were not solely the
result of a liberal environment, but also an excessive tax burden. The early
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f G
D
P 
p
er
 c
ap
ita
1
1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Figure 5.2. GDP per capita in the Mezzogiorno as a percentage of Northern GDP per
capita
Source: Bianchi et al. (2011). Note: the vertical line represents unification.
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foundations of the Italian state exerted a massive tax burden on a population
that was cautious of the state and citizens of neighboring regions. According
to Manestra (2010), the tax burden was approximately 10 percent higher than
in Great Britain as a result of a series of wars that did not have wide consensus
among Italy’s diverse population.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Giolitti government set out
to reform the tax system, but in the end the administration was unsuccessful,
leaving federal, regional, and local taxes relatively unchanged. This was a
problem not only at the legislative level; problems existed at the administrative
level as well, largely related to difficulties in implementing the new national
cadaster (compare this to the situation described by Marina Nistotskaya and
Michelle D’Arcy in Sweden, Chapter 2 in this volume). Furthermore, local
administrations were reluctant to update their lists of taxpayers, given that
their organizations were made up of taxpayers themselves (Manestra 2010).
Tax authorities also found it difficult to sanction taxpayers, as tax commissions
were often biased in favor of the taxpayer, largely as a result of the excessive tax
burden, exceeding 50 percent. In addition, the tax administration had difficulty
proving the incomes of the self-employed and other professionals (Manestra
2010). Taken together, this three-dimensional relationship between adminis-
tration (tax burden), the state (structure), and ideas such as distrust and caution
amongst the populace, fostered tax non-compliance very early on. Corrado
Gini (1962) echoes this when he claims that poor economic conditions, an
inherent lack of respect for the state, low administrative salaries, inconsistencies
in tax law, and an interpretation of private law were all drivers of low tax
compliance.
In addition to administrative difficulties, I suggest that the dynamics
between political parties also had an important impact on taxpayer behavior.
By the turn of the twentieth century, rising fears of socialism and a large labor
movement in the North made Catholics and right-wing liberals strange bed-
fellows. The Catholic Church and right-wing liberals, after the turn of the
century, made a conscious effort to build civic associations as an alternative to
a socialist workers’ movement. This played an important role in driving civic
consciousness and institutional development in Northern and Central Italy in
the years immediately after World War I. By contrast, the lack of any signifi-
cant industrial labor force in the South hampered political competition and
inhibited the formation of efficient public institutions or a civic-oriented
populace. Tarrow (1967: 168–9) argues that at the time of unification, “so
ingrained was the clientele system that the mass of new voters, most of them
rural and all of them dependent economically on the political elite, were easily
integrated into the existing system.” In other words, rather than having a
political choice, poor Southern peasants became dependent on their clientel-
istic relationships with local elites. The provision of individualized goods from
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patrons to clients inhibited the foundation of a civic-oriented populace. Here
we begin to see the beginnings of two separate equilibria. I characterize the
North as moving toward a high-trust/high-efficiency equilibrium shaped by
political competition and a strong industrial base, while the South’s low-
trust/low-efficiency equilibrium was formed by the state’s neglect of the
South and consequential clientelistic relationships.
The rise of a Catholic political party (the Italian People’s Party, Partito
Popolare Italiano) after 1914 marked the beginning of Catholic mainstream-
ing in Italian politics and challenged the dominance of the ruling party in
the North. Because the state had almost completely dismantled organized
Catholicism in the South in the early twentieth century, support for the
Italian People’s Party came mainly from the Northern regions of Italy. Pope
Benedict XV, Pope Pius’ successor, immediately reversed his predecessor’s
anti-modernization policies, such as banning Catholic trade unionism,
while improving the Church’s relationship with the Italian government and
the Italian people.While anti-Italian stigma had been attached to the Catholic
Church since the Risorgimento, Italian-Catholic politicians and the patriot-
ism of the Catholic clergy during the war changed the prevailing feelings
about Catholicism in Italy, bitterly dividing the old ruling class and paving
the way for outside parties such as the People’s Party and the Socialist
Party (Partito Socialista Italiano). These two parties took a combined total of
more than half of the legislative seats in the election of 1919. Only in the
South did the “old government” parties (Liberal Democrats, Partito Liberale
Democratico) win more than half the votes. This was largely the result of the
practice of trasformismo, in which ruling parties won over the opposition party
in return for political and, often, financial favors. The old-guard liberals,
especially in the South, made use of public resources for both individual
and political gain.
Political strife in Italy only further divided the North and South along party
lines. As a result of the 1919 election, 146 of the 156 Socialist deputies came
from the North and central regions; 76 of the 100 People’s Party deputies were
also from the North; and 162 of the 239 deputies from the Liberal Party and
the Radical Party (Partito Radicale), who had previously dominated parlia-
ment, were elected in the South. Although this election resulted in the first
“Radical” government, led by Francesco Nitti, political turmoil between the
Radicals, Socialists, and Fascists led to Nitti’s resignation and the return of
the Liberal Democrat Giolitti as prime minister in 1920. When elections were
called again in 1921, the Giolitti government’s hegemony was tenuous. To
solidify his control, he made certain concessions to the Fascists, including
adding them to the government’s party list. The disparate governing coalition
Giolitti put together was doomed from the outset, which resulted in his
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immediate resignation, to be followed by a string of short-lived prime minis-
ters and the eventual rise of Fascist leader Benito Mussolini.
In sum, the early twentieth century in Italy was marked by deep divisions
between the North and South. These divisions were economic as well as
political. The government extracted high taxes from the South to address its
debts from the Risorgimento and develop the North. Political parties com-
peted for the burgeoning industrial labor movement in the North by provid-
ing and building effective public services. The South, on the other hand, was
ruled by the old ruling partly (liberals), who enjoyed a large political monop-
oly. By providing public jobs and financial favors to the landed elite through
trasformismo, the ruling party maintained its hegemony in the South, margin-
alizing Southern citizens from the political process.
The Fascist Period
Here, I argue that the rise of Fascism reversed the Northern progress toward
a high-efficiency/high-trust equilibrium, and even furthered Southern resent-
ment toward the state. The Fascist period can be characterized by two
main approaches to building effective administrative capabilities and public
services across Italy: an attempt to modernize the tax system with a series of
uniform tax reforms and a series of public investments that had the unin-
tended effect of increasing the North–South economic divide. To dampen
some of the more negative consequences of the administration’s policies,
the government funneled money through quasi-state organizations, strength-
ening clientelism in the South. Whereas in the North, the high-compliance
environment began to unravel due to an authoritarian state and a second
world war, clientelism hardened the low-compliance environment in
the South.
Tax reform during the Fascist period involved three separate methods. The
first, liberal tax reform in the early Fascist period (1922–5), provided preferen-
tial tax treatment to productive industries with the misguided expectation
that these industries would then comply with existing tax law. After this
reform failed, Mussolini shifted from liberal tax policies to an authoritarian
model, where he would stigmatize and penalize evaders. He declared tax
evaders “the worst parasites in the nation” and increased tax enforcement
between 1926 and 1929 (Manestra 2010: 29). However, the corporatist eco-
nomic model and increased foreign commitments, such as the Italian–
Ethiopian War in the 1930s, which diverted administrative resources, led
him to restrain the more authoritarian aspects of the administration’s tax
policy, which demanded a large amount of administrative oversight. This
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 19/6/2018, SPi
Explaining Italian Tax Compliance: A Historical Analysis
115
led the administration back to the more liberal, cooperative model of the
1922–5 period, especially with respect to businesses. Mussolini’s industrial
policy further accentuated economic divisions.
Although tax and administration reform are important aspects of any suc-
cessful attempt to increase tax compliance, Mussolini’s complete disregard for
the South exacerbated the economic divisions between the North and South
and therefore the differences in their tax compliance environments. Economic
asymmetries and disproportional public investment generated a feeling of
unfairness and distrust in the economic system, both of which reinforced the
low compliance. Mussolini’s industrial policy accentuated economic divisions
between the North and the South by concentrating economic development in
engineering, steelworks, chemicals, and hydro-electricity supply—all industries
located in the industrial triangle of the Northwest. Almost half of indust-
rial workers and two-thirds of engineers worked in Lombardy, Liguria, and
Piedmont, while the majority of workers from the South were farmers and
artisans (Clark 1996). The state also increased the extent of the welfare state
in the Fascist period, making Northern industrial workers eligible for generous
benefits not available to Southernworkers—an imbalance that continues to this
day. Because of the North’s large industrial base, unionized workers were able to
lobby for and win larger pensions than the average Southern Italian peasant.
This contributed to patronage and clientelistic practices as a means of income
supplementation in the South. Clients would directly exchange their votes
for public employment and favorable tax treatment (Ferrera 1996).
Moreover, Mussolini’s push to project Italy as an international power had
adverse consequences for the Southern economy. Mussolini implemented a
revaluation of the lira in 1926 to project Italy’s position, which reduced wages
and sharply increased unemployment, largely in the agricultural South
(Neville 2014). In the late 1920s through the early 1930s, Mussolini increased
tariffs on wheat, which amounted to a large concession to landowners, who
gained the most from the government policies, whereas Southern peasants
were hit the hardest. To lessen the damage in the South, the administration
funneled jobs through parastati, quasi-governmental agencies that dealt with
health, welfare, and pensions. Distribution through quasi-governmental
agencies then became the most important criterion for resource distribution
(Walston 1988).
Fascism only enlarged the economic and social disparity in Italy, and espe-
cially in Southern Italy. Moreover, Fascism’s antidemocratic foundation and
its overwhelming reliance on the state as the center of individual life reversed
the virtuous circle in the North, while increasing discontent in the South due
to the state’s general neglect of that region. This had the effect of generating
low trust and low compliance across the peninsula.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 19/6/2018, SPi
John D’Attoma
116
The First Republic
The period after World War II brought great, but asymmetric, prosperity to
Italy. Just as during the previous period, political competition among the
Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and the Communists (Partito Commu-
nista Italiano) led to major public works and investment in Northern Italy,
while the Christian Democrat political monopoly in the South intensified
clientelistic networks. Although the central government invested heavily in
the South beginning in 1950 with a Fund for the South (Cassa per il mezzo-
giorno), the implementation of the fund was greatly affected by clientelism.
In 1970, regional governments were established, further exacerbating the
underlying issues in the South. Regional governments were granted more
autonomy and discretion in the distribution of resources, especially financial
resources, which they could then funnel to private interests.While clientelism
became stronger in the South as a result, one of the largest corruption scandals
in Italian history unfolded in the North. Widespread distrust in the governing
parties brought down the government and led to the Second Republic.
After World War II, Italian citizens were polarized both economically and
ideologically. In the period 1944–6, Sicilian farmers formed a movement
aimed at secession from the North, which led to a June 2, 1946 popular vote
pitting the Italian dynasty (the monarchy ruled by Humbert II of Savoy)
against the Republic. The North, led by the Communists, Socialists, and
Christian Democrats, favored the Republic; the majority of the South voted
to uphold the dynasty (Gilmour 2011; Pollard 1998). In 1946, tensions
between the Communists and the Christian Democrats presented another
challenge to national unity: while the Communist Party was closely tied to
the Soviets, aid and investment from the US government and US firms influ-
enced the Christian Democrats and the Alcide De Gasperi government.
The 1947 Italian Constitution, however, showed remarkable levels of com-
promise between the parties, reflecting also a deep distrust in the state. The
Italian Constitution, first and foremost, protects the individual from the state,
which has unintentionally hindered the ability of the tax administration to
collect taxes. Article 53 states: “all shall contribute to public expenditure in
accordance with their means.” Consequently, assessing an individual’s means
accurately is an arduous process. The intended effect, however, was to associ-
ate taxes with an individual’s moral sensibilities. Referring to the tax reforms,
Vanoni elegantly stated in the House of Deputies (Resoconti parlamentari
1948: 3744):
In our country there is often the feeling that tax evasion has become a way of
life . . . the individual almost considers it a legitimate form of defense against an
imposition he considers detrimental to their sphere of individual action . . . tax
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evasion takes on the characteristics of real and substantial anarchy, a negation of the
first requirements of social life and is precisely why it seems irrepressible to get to a
system in which there is neither justification, nor moral, nor techniques for evasion,
and that leads to more open condemnation, moral rather than legal, for the evader.
Vanoni thus sees tax evasion within this context-specific equilibrium. The
legitimate fear that the state will infringe on individual rights reflects the
historical circumstances specific to the Italian taxpayer.
Between the new Finance Minister Enzio Vanoni and his colleagues there
was wide consensus that administrative reform was the most pressing issue
regarding taxation. Cesare Cosciani (1950) argued that the history of the tax
system was plagued by irrationality perpetuated by a legislature that created
an overabundance of laws that only specialists could understand. With past
failures in administration in mind, Vanoni implemented broad, but incre-
mental, tax reform, emphasizing taxation as a democratic responsibility. On
January 11, 1951 under Finance Minister Vanoni the Republic passed the
largest tax reform since the Fascist period, known as the Legge Vanoni (Vanoni
Law). The law had four main features: (1) taxpayers—both employees and the
self-employed—had to fill out annual tax returns; (2) greater progressivity
combined with lower income taxes overall; (3) a series of consumption
taxes; and (4) business taxes on items such as stamps and licensing
(Ambrosetti 2004).
Vanoni’s measures, especially those addressing mutual trust between tax-
payer and administration, did not outlive his term, however. Audits actually
became more inefficient and tax investigators were increasingly underpaid
compared to private tax accountants (Manestra 2010). In 1959, the adminis-
tration began raising rates on everything from capital gains to self-employed
income. As a result, taxpayers increasingly came to disrespect the administra-
tors or tax collectors. Therefore, highly paid tax accountants, who are paid
to keep taxes low for their clients, were in direct conflict with an underpaid
and under-appreciated tax administration. Administrators were at a clear
disadvantage.
Though the 1950s marked the beginning of approximately two decades of
great prosperity, data provided by Clark (1996: 357) depicts Southern Italy as
similar tomany underdeveloped countries, but much larger in population and
territory than most. The disparities between the North and the South were so
considerable and evident that the state instituted the Fund for the South, a
rural spending agency providing roads, housing, and water to rural areas.
Although the “Italian Economic Miracle” led to a convergence of incomes,
with Southern income reaching approximately 70 percent of the national
average, the Fund also established large fiscal transfers from North to South
and significant migration flows from South to North. This fueled cultural
stereotypes and out-group resentments.
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The “economic miracle” and a massive injection of state spending on
welfare (education and healthcare) significantly increased the living standards
of the average Italian individual in the early 1960s. However, by 1967 the
Italian economy was showing signs of crisis. A large migration of unskilled
Southern workers successfully supplanted highly skilled factory workers in
the North, which led to major factory floor protests throughout Northern
Italy. Subsequently, Southern factory workers took to the shop floor to
demand better pensions, social security, housing, and health services. By
1976, the trade union movement had become a major force in Italian politics
encompassing nearly 50 percent of workers (Clark 1996: 377). Large pay raises,
however, exponentially increased overall labor costs in Italy, causing a con-
siderable downturn amongst Italian firms. With labor costs exceeding by 39
percent those experienced by British and German firms, profits tapered off
significantly by the end of the decade. Both the extreme right and left
responded to the crisis with political terrorism, including assassinations and
kidnappings.
Weak public institutions, such as an unstable parliament and a constitution
that severely hampered administration, the resilience of strong informal
institutions, such as clientelism, and economic downturn reinforced this
low-trust/low-efficiency equilibrium. From unification to Fascism, followed
by the First Republic through the end of the economicmiracle, we can observe
several recurring themes in which the administration attempts to address low
tax compliance by reorganizing tax administration, but without addressing
the underlying defects of the tax system. New laws were stacked upon old
laws, and new taxes were introduced to pay for wars and social programs. The
tax system became increasingly more complicated and incomprehensible to
the vast majority of taxpayers, further decreasing trust in a severely under-
funded administration. Not only was there a lack of trust between taxpayers
and the administration, but strong regional resentment stemming from long-
standing cultural stereotypes lingered, and even proliferated, as a result of
migration patterns, economic insecurities, and fiscal transfers. And once
again, Italians were concerned about political crises and, consequently, polit-
ical terrorism. These institutional and political dynamics structured the way in
which Italians viewed their state and fellow citizens, consolidating the low-
compliance environment.
From the Tax Reform of 1972 to the Present
Two decades after regional governments had been enshrined into the consti-
tution, the state introduced regional governments in the spring of 1970. By
the mid-1970s, Italian regions could provide subsidies, fund and staff welfare
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agencies, draw up regional development plans, and organize their own
cooperatives. However, as Clark writes, these regional governments fed the
Calabrian Mafia (ndrangheta) and the Neapolitan camorra, with local barons
supporting particularism, rather than creating more efficient, democratic
institutions. “There may,” he notes, “have been little popular enthusiasm
for the regions, but many of the organized interests-groups thought they
were splendid” (1996: 392). Further unsuccessful attempts to curb tax evasion
led to tougher sanctions on taxpayers and large tax reforms. However, a large
aspect of these reforms concerned tax amnesty programs and a new Sector
Studies program, both of which only furthered the low-compliance environ-
ment. Finally, in the early 1990s large-scale corruption was uncovered, bring-
ing down the government and ushering in the era of Silvio Berlusconi—a
renowned tax evader himself.
After the introduction of regional governments in 1970, important legisla-
tion was introduced to reform the tax system. Tax reform introduced in 1973
by theMinister of Finance, Luigi Preti, forced Italy to construct amoremodern
tax system to match the demands of a developed nation. It further had to
complement a burgeoning public deficit and a far more uncertain situation
than the preceding decade. The basic foundation of these reforms rested on
the same principles as previous tax reforms: administrative changes, especially
reducing a bloated bureaucracy and the numerous superfluous laws; and
improving how the administration calculated taxable income. This included
the establishment of a variety of new taxes such as the IRPEF (national
progressive income tax), IRPEG (corporate income tax, replaced by IRES),
ILOR (local income tax), INVIM (capital gains tax), and VAT.
The state even attempted to revert to a more authoritarian regime—tough
sanctions and stigmatization—to enforce tax compliance. Provincial news-
papers throughout Italy published the names of famous peoplewhohad evaded
their taxes as well as 200,000 tax evaders between 1979 and 1981. Law 516/
1982, the so-called manette agli evasori (handcuffs for evaders), designated a
number of tax behaviors as revealing an attempt to evade taxes, making them
serious criminal offenses with increased penalties. Prior tomanette agli evasori, a
judge could not indict an offender before there was undeniable proof of evasion
(Santoro 2010), which, as I noted above, was an arduous process since the
burden of proof was the responsibility of the investigators. Manette agli evasori
resulted in an overburdened judicial system and a series of amnesty programs.
AsManestra (2010: 42) states, “handcuffs for all, became handcuffs for no one.”
The courts found many of the provisions of manette agli evasori unconstitu-
tional, and only a small fraction of accused transgressors were convicted under
the law (Santoro 2010: Kindle location 951–2).
Additionally, tax amnesties and the inability to punish decreased compliance
by influencing the compliance environment and social norms (Alm, McKee,
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and Beck 1990). Nonetheless, the Italian tax administration has relied heavily
on amnesties since unification. According to Manestra (2010), there were
eighty-three separate amnesties between 1900 and 2002, and between the
1970 tax reform and 2002 a form of tax amnesty was used every year. One of
the major defects of repeated amnesty is it decreases the amount of risk associ-
ated with evasion. If potential evaders foresee an amnesty in the future, they
will likely underreport their income. The use of amnesty was so common that
tax evasion became a safe way to increase one’s income, as illustrated by the
responses from the 2004 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Wealth. When
asked about their opinion on tax amnesties, 50 percent of respondents said
they were unfair, compared to 36 percent who said they were a good policy.
In another question participants were asked what they believed the outcome
of amnesty to be; 32 percent responded, “tax evasion increases because the
amnesty rewards tax evaders and discourages honest taxpayers” and 30 percent
said, “tax evasion doesn’t change because once tax evaders have regularized
their past position, they begin to evade tax again until the next amnesty.”4
Following the 1973 reform, there were three main approaches that shaped
the 1990s tax reform bill, according to Manestra (2010). The most important
aspect of these procedural changes was reforming the way in which small
businesses fulfilled their accounting obligations. Structural changes attempted
to fix the major sources of tax revenue, mainly VAT and direct taxes. Finally,
quantitative reform set out to address the number of taxes, especially on
sources of income. The less punitive Law 154/1991 and Law 74/2000 replaced
manette agli evasori. As was common throughout the neoliberal era, tax reform
in this period reduced tax rates while broadening the taxable base. However,
income tax evasion actually increased after implementation of the tax reform
through 1978, decreasing slightly in 1978–80, but never falling below 33.7
percent in this period.5
The most important feature of the 1990s tax reform was the adoption of
Studi di Settore (Sector Studies) in 1998. Due to the large size of the self-
employed and small-business sectors, focusing on this particular aspect of
the economy was an important step forward for the administration. While
most countries collect various data on individuals and companies, then place
them into homogeneous populations based on those characteristics with
minimum expected incomes, Italy is rare in that it actually makes this data
available to the taxpayer before they file their taxes. Moreover, published min-
imum expected incomes are first negotiated between the tax administration
and taxpayer representatives, such as the Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia
e del Lavoro (CNEL). Sector Studies came out of the recognition that the
main driver of tax evasion in Italy was its particular economic structure, but
the small-business sector’s clout with government officials was so great that
Sector Studies actually resulted in a more favorable situation for most taxpayers.
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It is easy to predict the outcome of a policy that informs taxpayers of their
expected minimum income level. As Bergman (2009: 10) elegantly argued,
“People maximize utilities inasmuch as they pay as little taxes as they can. But
the environment in which people operate fundamentally shapes how they
frame the maximization benefits.” Hence, those who make above the expected
minimum will reduce their income to match the mandatory minimum, while
those who earn below theminimumwill either risk being audited, which is very
likely, and bear those costs, or they will increase their income to avoid the legal
costs of an audit. The societal effect of this is also significant. If it is known that
small businesses and the self-employed can easily avoid taxes, the ripple effects
will weigh heavily on the Italian tax system.
The continual unsuccessful attempts to fix the tax system, coupled with a
series of corruption scandals that would eventually bring down Italy’s
national government, only exasperated the low-trust equilibrium. The largest
corruption case, Tangentopoli (Bribesville), exposed a number of high-ranking
public officials (half of parliament) for acts of bribery and led to the so-called
“Second Republic” and the prominence of Silvio Berlusconi—a billionaire
businessman who came in as a political outsider profiting from the lack of
trust and promising to reduce taxes. He also was later convicted of tax evasion.
The vicious circle that Steinmo discusses in the Introduction to this volume is
evident throughout Italian history. An inefficient, corrupt, or a perceived-
to-be-illegitimate state shapes a climate of distrust, rendering tax collection
troublesome. Thus, the efficient provision of public goods becomes increas-
ingly more difficult, reinforcing this low-trust/low-efficiency environment,
and, in that, low tax compliance.
Discussion and Conclusions
Walk into any bar in Italy and you will likely hear someone lamenting their
high taxes, poor public services, and corrupt politicians. The compliance
environment is a direct reflection of this. Indeed, taxes are often a major
topic of national conversation. The fight against tax evasion in Italy goes
back long before Italy was a unified nation. In fact, aspects of Italian life that
we often take for granted are often the result of some clever way of circum-
venting tax laws. For example, a salt tax in twelfth-century Pisa persuaded
Florentines to stop using salt when baking bread—an unfortunate trend that
continues to this day. It has also been suggested that the beautiful Triulli
buildings in Puglia were built with dry walls and without mortar to allow
settlers to easily dismantle them when the “taxman” came. Furthermore, tax
evasion has historically been so rampant that Mussolini famously claimed
that tax evaders are the worst parasites on earth. Similarly, former Prime
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Minister Mario Monti asked his fellow citizens to stop referring to tax evaders
as furbi, meaning clever. Unfortunately, these references tend to lend weight
to the amoral familial approach.
However, the flaw in the amoral familialist argument leads us back to the
complexities this study has sought to address in terms of tax evasion, compli-
ance, and morale. By constructing a historical landscape dating back to the
Risorgimento through the fall of the First Republic, I have identified several
periods and institutions that have influenced the relationship between state
and citizen.
The Risorgimento clearly had significant repercussions for Northern and
Southern institutions and, in that, defined two different patterns of taxpayer
behavior. I have argued that Southern Italians perceived the North as a
distinct entity apart from themselves, and even as colonizers, while the
North embraced calls from liberals for a unified nation state. Because the
North was politically dominant, the South was expected to contribute a
disproportionate amount of revenue to fund public works projects largely
going to the North.
The rise of socialism and a socialist workers’movement in the North forced
Catholics and right-wing liberals to join forces in direct competition to the
socialists for the growing working class. While the South was left neglected by
the political class, clientelism became deeply ingrained into the Southern
way of life. In the North, political competition helped shape functioning
public institutions and a thriving labor movement. This put the North on
track to form a high-trust/high-efficiency equilibrium, while a low-trust/low-
efficiency environment was established in the South.
The advent of Fascism altered the North’s course, however. Unification, two
world wars and Fascism shaped the compliance environment in both the
North and South. After the fall of Fascism and the end of World War II, a
deep distrust in the state was further reflected in the new Republic’s constitu-
tion. An underlying fear that the government would infringe personal free-
dom and rights made tax collection increasingly difficult. This led to several
tax reforms, most of which had very little effect on the compliance environ-
ment. Moreover, many of themore intrusive policies that would have resulted
in increased controls were deemed unconstitutional. The administration thus
felt handcuffed by certain institutional arrangements, rendering their only
option a number of amnesty programs.
These amnesty programs merely deepened the low-compliance environ-
ment, making it increasingly difficult to enforce existing tax laws. The admin-
istration, realizing that the main source of evasion was the self-employed and
small-business sectors, implemented a series of reforms called Studi dei Settore
in the late 1990s. However, due to the political power of this particularly large
sector of the economy, the reform ended up benefiting the taxpayer instead of
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the administration. Since then, the administration has attempted to fix some
of the underlying problems with the tax system through pre-populated tax
returns and a push to settle tax disputes out of court. Figures suggest that
revenue as a result of these measures has increased.
Social norms and equilibria are sticky. Apart from major punctuations in
the environment, change is usually incremental. Therefore, Italian policy-
makers must address the underlying features of the low-trust/low-efficiency
compliance environment. What is it that is driving this contagious behav-
ior? How can policymakers address the metaphorical elephant in the room
(the self-employed and small businesses) while at the same time fixing
underlying economic issues? Vanoni had impeccable foresight when he
said that administration reform must be implemented in a way that con-
siders tax compliance as part of a holistic approach, accounting for not only
the administration, but also the institutional (both formal and informal)
environment. Benchmarking and learning from other European countries
such as Sweden regarding these issues could be a step forward in creating a
new taxpayer equilibrium.
Notes
1. In the Northern regions from Lombardy to Lazio, evasion of the regional tax on
production (Imposta Regionale sulle Attivita Produttive, IRAP) ranges from about
13 percent to 54 percent; in the South (the Mezzogiorno), covering Molise to Sicily,
it ranges from about 55 percent to 94 percent (see Figure 5.1). It is worth noting that
both Liguria and Abruzzo do not conform to the expected North–South pattern.
Abruzzo performs just slightly worse on The Quality of Government index (see
Table 5.1) than Liguria, but the percentage of self-employed in Liguria is approxi-
mately one percent higher according to Istat (see http://noi-italia.istat.it/). The
combination of lower-than-average quality of government and a high rate of self-
employed individuals in Liguria could explain this unexpected result. In addition,
Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche all have higher rates of self-employed individuals
than Abruzzo.
2. Italians’ perception of one another varies across regions. See Putnam, Leonardi, and
Nanetti (1994); Tabellini (2010).
3. The center made up the remaining 28 percent of GDP.
4. www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/tematiche/indagini-famiglie-imprese/bilanci-
famiglie/documentazione/index.html.
5. The figures are cumulative figures of evasion and avoidance rates for employees,
agricultural workers, manufacturing, and the self-employed, calculated by Bernardi
(1989); Visco (1984a; 1984b; 1992); and Vitaletti (1984) using data on taxable
incomes provided by Istat. Amore detailed table, aggregated by type of employment,
can be found in Manestra (2010).
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credits for Huey, Dewey, and Louie, and found that his taxes came to $13.
After Donald races from Hollywood to Washington, the film shows how tax
revenues (stacks of gold coins) are transmuted into guns, planes, and ships.
Taxes were needed to beat the Axis. At the end when the American flag is
formed by clouds around a setting sun, the narrator intones, “Taxes will keep
democracy on the march.”
In the controversial pamphlet Battle Stations for All, issued in February 1943,
the Office of War Information pamphleteers sought to defuse accusations that
the unprecedented level of taxation was in some way benefiting the New Deal
social agenda. In a box set off from the rest of the page and headlined “Non-
War Expenditures Reduced,” the pamphlet asserted that “Under the new
budget submitted by the President, ninety-six cents of every dollar spent by
the Government will be for war costs and interest on the public debt and only
four cents for so-called ‘non-war’ purposes.”18 In later radio messages, the
percentage of the federal budget going to the cost of war was set between
93 and 95 percent. And the federal budget was at unprecedented levels. The
Office ofWar Information in 1944 described the enormity of the costs. “Direct
war expenditures for fiscal 1943 were 12 billion dollars [ . . . ] a figure totally
beyond human comprehension. But that incomprehensible sum figures down
to $2,894 every second of the day [ . . . ] an amount equivalent to about a year’s
wages for perhaps half of the persons who are expected to file income tax
returns by March 15.”19
By making the argument that taxes went to defeating the Axis and not to
Dr. New Deal, the administration tried to legitimate a mass income tax as a
very clear payment for war. If small-time taxpayers had not had to pay before,
it was the war that was responsible. The “real authors of our tax burden” were
“in Berlin and Tokyo” (Jones 1988–9: 721). As Eddie Cantor pointed out on his
radio show in February 1944:
We want all you Axis countries to know that we in America are busy right now
making out our income taxes. We know this must frighten you, because it’s these
taxes that paid for the ships that brought our men to your shores this year and
we’ll continue to pay our taxes so that we can beat you, Mr. Hitler and so that we
can beat you, Mr. Tojo, and you, Mr. Mussolini [ . . . ] Musso—Whatever happened
to you, Mr. Mussolini?20
If it was the war (and just the war) that was being financed by new income tax
payers, the legitimacy of the tax depended on assurances that everyone (par-
ticularly the wealthy) were paying their fair share. In late 1941, Irving Berlin
submitted a song entitled “I Paid My Income Tax Today” to Treasury Secretary
Henry Morgenthau Jr. A lower income tax payer is the voice in the song—glad
to be newly subject to the income tax along with millions of other new
taxpayers. Seeing an airborne bomber, the singer claims he helped to build
them just as “Rockefeller” did.21
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A December 30, 1941 letter from Morgenthau to Berlin suggests that the
Treasury commissioned the song:
The more I think about your new song, the more I wonder how you ever managed
to do the job so well. It wasn’t an easy assignment tomake people sing about taxes,
but you have done it beautifully, and also hit the nail on the head as far as Treasury
policy is concerned.22
In early 1942, the Treasury Department sent the Barry Wood recording of
“I Paid My Income Tax Today” to 872 radio stations with a letter asking for
frequent air time. Four days later, the Danny Kaye recording of the same song
was sent out as well. Sheetmusic was sent to sponsors of musical programs and
the networks were asked to play the song as often as possible until the March
15 deadline (Jones 1988–9: 714).
The government also sought to insert appropriate wartime messages into
movies that were largely for entertainment. The Office of War Information’s
Government Information Manual for the Motion Picture Industry suggested
that movies show uncomplaining taxpayers. David O. Selznick’s Since You
Went Away followed up on this hint by showing a wealthy man claiming
that it “suits me if they tax me 100 percent!” (Jones 1988–9: 718). Assurance
that the wealthy were willing to pay their fair share apparently was intended
to make income tax payments by the less well-to-do more palatable.
Those who did not meet their tax obligations were treated as “others” and,
most assuredly, un-American. In a second Donald Duck tax film, The Spirit of
’43 (Disney 1943), Donald’s paycheck is the subject of a debate within
Donald’s conscience between a spendthrift and a Scrooge McDuck-like char-
acter. This was before current payment or withholding, when Americans
needed to save to ensure tax payments. Disney’s McDuck reminds Donald
that “every dollar you spend for something you don’t need is a dollar – to help
the Axis.” The spendthrift is clad in a zoot suit and transmutes into Hitler.
Mr. McDuck in his kilt, interestingly, is all-American. The zoot suit emerged as
a symbol of un-American outsiders in another context. In June 1943, sailors in
downtown Los Angeles dragged Mexican American youths from their seats in
the Orpheum Theater, beat them, and destroyed their zoot suits. The Zoot Suit
Riots demonstrated the marginalized societal status of Latinos in wartime
(Sparrow 2011: 227–37). The Disney tax film made use of these racial stereo-
types in encouraging adherence to the tax laws.
Making Tax Payments Less Voluntary
With the income tax’s application to average Americans, it was clear to federal
tax officials that the infrastructure of tax collection was “poorly adapted to the
budgets and flow of income of 44 million taxpayers” (Paul 1954: 333–4).
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At the time, income taxes were not collected. Instead, they were paid in
quarterly installments in the following year. As incomes rose with rising
employment and wages, failure to tax concurrently with income was an
expensive defect in tax design.
Placing the income tax on a current basis found an outspoken champion in
Beardsley Ruml, Treasurer of R. H. Macy & Company and Chairman of the
Board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Ruml professed concern for
retirees and enlistees or draftees who experienced declining incomes, yet were
expected to pay income taxes for a previous year out of more meager incomes.
The solution was for the federal government to require income tax payments
currently, but a problem lay in creating the transition to this method. Under
the existing tax system, Year 1’s tax liability was paid in Year 2. If, in Year 2,
the tax payments were made current, a taxpayer would be required to pay Year
1’s and Year 2’s taxes in Year 2. This was seen as an unacceptable situation. In
essence, Ruml’s plan was to forgive Year 1 tax liability, but require the tax-
payer to make his Year 2 tax payments. For Ruml, this was the “daylight
savings” approach to government finance; a proposal under which the Treas-
ury would lose only when “the books would finally be closed [on Judgment
Day].” The Treasury objected to the greater benefits the wealthy would receive
by reason of Year 1 forgiveness under the Ruml Plan. While some forgiveness
was necessary to make the system current, the Treasury Department was
disappointed by Congress’ eventual solution in the Current Tax Payment
Act of 1943—essentially a 75 percent forgiveness of the lower of 1942 or
1943 tax liabilities. Unforgiven tax liabilities could be paid over the following
two years.23
Most importantly, the Act established the now familiar withholding system
for tax collection. The withholding system was a significant advance in
administration of the income tax. Elimination of delay in payments made
the income taxmuchmore responsive to wartime revenue expansion. As wage
earners had become used to periodic deductions from their paychecks for
Social Security and unemployment taxes, income tax payment also became
less detectable. The advent of withholding ensured the income tax’s place as a
major and massive revenue source.
The problem faced by income tax propagandists during World War II was
legitimating the imposition of that tax on average citizens when it was for-
merly targeted exclusively at the wealthy. In seeking to justify mass income
taxation, public officials struggled with the recent history of the tax as a class
tax and with the reluctance to implement President Roosevelt’s domestic and
social agenda. While seeking to make reasons for taxpaying legible and per-
suasive to average citizens, Congress succeeded to a great extent in placing the
tax beyond justification; to make it so routine that rationalization was not as
necessary. The withholding system, by placing responsibilities for reporting
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and payment on third parties, removed critical aspects of the taxpaying
process from the majority of taxpayers who were employees and transferred
them to their employers. This trend was furthered by the opportunity to file a
return by answering a few questions on one’s withholding receipt (FormW-2)
and sending it to the Bureau of Internal Revenue where the tax due or refund
owed would be computed ( Jones 1988–9).
The Postwar Period
It is interesting to note that during much of World War II, there is little
mention of tax evasion, avoidance, or penalties. This is in stark contrast to
prosecutions and investigations of the wealthiest taxpayers (including, unsuc-
cessfully, former Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon) during the 1930s. The
Treasury understood its very limited wartime capacity. As Secretary Mor-
genthau said in March 1943, “Suppose we have to go out and try to arrest
fivemillion people?” (Jones 1996: 139). The war itself, as the project funded by
tax revenues, was a point of near consensus for the public. What would
become of the tax system and compliance programs after VJ Day?
In an undated “Report on Postwar Taxation,” the conclusion was evident.
“The individual income tax . . .must be kept a mass tax, because after the war
very large amounts of revenue will still need to be raised for many generations
to come.” This was the most flexible and important revenue source for the
federal government. Dropping rates would be preferable to higher exemp-
tions. “It would be bad for tax morale to drop millions of taxpayers from the
tax rolls one year and in another year to bring them again under the income
tax, only to drop them again as revenue requirements change.”24
The highest rates from the World War II years stayed with little modifica-
tion, dropping from a top rate of 94 percent to 92 percent during the 1950s.25
There was demand for a tax cut after the war and it took the form of a
surrender on a tax compliance issue and a means of recognizing and encour-
aging marriage. As marginal rates crept up and more citizens became federal
income tax payers, attention began to turn to the individually based nature of
the federal income tax. Some states including Oklahoma, Oregon, Nebraska,
Michigan, and Pennsylvania switched from Anglo-American common-law
marital property systems to community property. This was because marital
rights under the common-law system were seen as inchoate and insufficiently
robust to support division of (usually) a husband’s earnings or income from
property owned by him. By contrast, in community property states, originally
Southern and Western states, a husband and wife would each have an equal,
undivided interest in income earned by a spouse and in income from com-
munity property acquired during marriage. A 1930 US Supreme Court case,
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Poe v. Seaborn held that in community property states, each spouse should be
taxed on one-half of the community income, whether that income arose from
labor or from capital.26
Because of steep progressive rates, a married couple would, as a couple, pay
the least tax if they could divide income between them equally. This was
relatively easily accomplished in community property states. It was more
difficult to accomplish in common-law states. Husbands tended to be primary
breadwinners and joint spousal ownership of property was not engrained in
property titles as yet (Hines 1966). Average citizens in non-community prop-
erty states resented their disfavored tax position. An Iowan wrote to his
senator, Bourke B. Hickenlooper: “I wish you would do all you can to inact
[sic] a law, so that husband and wife can split their income and thereby
reducing their income tax. It isn’t right that some states are able to do so
and others are not . . . I have a brother-in-law [in California] that has much
larger net income than I have and yet we have to pay more income taxes than
they do.”27 In common law states, the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the
courts were called upon to assess the tax validity of a new proliferation of
family partnerships—attempts to split income among family members. The
Bureau took a relatively hard line on these partnerships often finding that
wives made no capital or labor contributions, or using gendered measures of
the value of women’s work to the business. In many of these cases, the
partnership agreements were not viewed as a sufficient basis for income-
splitting between spouses or among family members (Jones 1988).
With more states converting to the “foreign” community property system
(which afforded women somewhat increased legal ownership of marital
income and property) and with an explosion of family partnerships, pressures
to reduce taxes after the war and to deal with asymmetrical family taxation
resulted in the federal adoption of the joint return in 1948. This original joint
return computed the tax on one-half of the couple’s income, and then
doubled the tax—reaching roughly the same split income result as commu-
nity property achieved. The difference was that state legislatures could offer
tax reductions only by altering married people’s legal rights to income and
property. Congress enacted tax reduction without any change in the legal
rights between spouses (Jones 1988).
The joint return came at a propitious time and was aligned with changes in
American culture. During the war, many women took jobs outside the home,
sometimes in family businesses, sometimes as clerks and secretaries, some-
times as the iconic Rosie the Riveter in defense industries. Once the war had
been won, over two million women left the labor force in 1946. Women
represented 35.4 percent of the civilian labor force in 1944, but that figure
fell to 28.6 percent in 1947, although it was still higher than it was before the
war (Hartmann 1982: 168).
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For some women, the war’s end meant a return to domesticity and social
and gender stability. As tax legislative counsel and (later) Harvard law profes-
sor Stanley S. Surrey said in 1948:
[One implication of the split-income plan is that] [w]ives need not continue to
master the details of the retail drug business, electrical equipment business, or
construction business, but may turn from their partnership “duties” to the pursuit
of homemaking. (Surrey 1948: 111)
The return to postwar domesticity and the production of a generation of baby-
boomers was also consonant with Cold War ideology. American domestic life
with a wife working at home was seen by many Americans as superior to the
factory and other work performed by Soviet women. The 1959 “kitchen
debate” between Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev illustrated this contrast. Nixon claimed that “diversity, the right
to choose, [ . . . ] is the most important thing. [ . . . ] We have many different
manufacturers and many different kinds of washing machines so that the
housewives have a choice. [ . . . ] What we want is to make easier the life of
our housewives” (May 2008: 422). Khrushchev rejected that “capitalist atti-
tude toward women” (May 2008: 432). In the United States, Nixon was viewed
as prevailing even if his characterization of domestic life in postwar America
was not entirely accurate. Adopting the joint return served as a legal expres-
sion for the postwar nuclear family—culturally expressive, not disruptive of
the familial status quo, and easier to enforce than the earlier individually
based regime. In addition, it solved an apparent unfairness in the income
tax system from the point of view of many Americans.
Once the atmosphere and imperative of total war was removed, what was it
that taxpayers were paying for in its absence? For the Truman administration,
World War II quickly morphed into a cold war with the USSR and other
communist movements. Just as World War II was configured as a war against
evil, godless communism came to be seen as the antithesis of the Americanway.
After WorldWar II and during the ColdWar, the United States—containing
Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and secularists—began to adhere to what Jewish
theologian Will Herberg called a “civic religion of the American Way of Life”
(Marty 1996: 294). A rather abstracted religion was seen as foundational.
President Dwight Eisenhower stated that “a democracy cannot exist without
a religious base. I believe in democracy” (Marty 1996: 302). Godliness was seen
as the cause of America’s growth. Americans were to battle communism, in the
words of Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, “for [the new
enemy’s] aim is total conquest—not merely of the earth, but of the human
mind. He seeks to destroy the very idea of freedom, the concept of God
Himself” (Marty 1996: 306). Yet in a country with many faiths and many
denominations within those faiths, historian Daniel Boorstin stressed the
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importance of “nondenominationalism” and an “ability to produce a kind of
elixir, sometimes vapid and always unpungent, a blended distillate of all our
different religions” (Marty 1996: 308). The signal achievement of this civic
religion may be the addition to “one nation” of “under God” to the Pledge of
Allegiance in 1954 and “In God We Trust” as the national motto in 1956. It
expressed a providential faith in American exceptionalism, strength, and
superiority. The high point of this civic religion was the late 1940s to the
early 1960s. Tax revenues were tithes to that project.
In the postwar period, churchmembership and church construction experi-
enced enormous growth (Ahlstrom 2004: 949–63). The alignment of civic
religion and the federal government in the fight against communism seemed
to support defense outlays and, for some, increased foreign aid.
For much of the first part of the twentieth century, the Protestant Federal
Council of Churches and its successor, the National Council of Churches
(NCC), presumed to take a leading role in articulating a Christian ethic for
the United States. Formed during the height of the progressive social gospel
movements, the Federal Council of Churches sought to institutionalize
the social gospel—“the application of the teaching of Jesus and the total
message of the Christian salvation to society, the economic life, and social
institutions . . . as well as to individuals” (Hopkins 1967: 98). Individual char-
ity was seen as inadequate to the challenges of modern society. “Stewardship
was then applied in a sense to the state, which, as guardian of God’s gifts to
the people, should oversee their just distribution” (Hopkins 1967: 98).
Ties to government were especially visible after World War II as President
Eisenhower placed the cornerstone for the new National Council of Churches
building in New York and as prominent figures with political ties such as Allen
Foster Dulles and Charles P. Taft were active in its affairs.
Nevertheless the postwar period saw the NCC come under attack frommore
conservative business-allied groups. The NCC formed a Lay Committee and
J. Howard Pew, a retired Sun Oil executive, became its leader. Pew viewed the
NCC as comprised of “ministerial economic illiterates.” Dupont executive
Jasper Crane wrote in 1948 that economist Friedrich Hayek had told him
that “it was the Church of England that led Great Britain into socialism.
Must we admit that the Federal Council of Churches is leading the United
States on the road to serfdom?” ( Jones 2002: 95).
A survey by libertarian religious group Spiritual Mobilization found that
88 percent of ministers found nothing morally wrong with a progressive
income tax, and 59 percent felt it was just to tax the wealthy at rates as
high as 80 percent. Only 23 percent of clergy felt that “taxing the rich to
help the poor through government welfare is against Christian (ethical)
principles, because it removes the voluntary aspect of true charity” ( Jones
2002: 106).
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Pew and his allies, the National Association of Manufacturers and Spiritual
Mobilization, battled NCC liberals during the 1950s with both sides employ-
ing schools on economics for ministers, book reviews, and publications of
various sorts. Rev. John Bennett saw two warring factions within Protestant-
ism: a Social Gospel emphasis “rather uncritical of collectivist answers”
against “a very extreme type of individualism which wants to go back to an
absolutely unreconstructed capitalism” (Jones 2002: 162). Conservatives
accused the NCC leadership of communist sympathies, distributing a pamph-
let entitled “How Red Is the Federal/National Council of Churches?” Some
NCC leaders did have socialist ties. As Senator Joseph McCarthy began to
move against NCC leaders in 1956, President Eisenhower condemned such
attacks as “irresponsible” and “against American principles of freedom and
democracy.” The attacks were defused, but left a weakened NCC in its wake.
Polling in the 1950s showed Americans were supportive of progressive
taxation. In their famous 1952 essay, “The Uneasy Case for Progressive Tax-
ation,” ProfessorsWalter Blum and Harry Kalven Jr. identified the reduction of
economic inequality as the strongest case for progression. They, too, cited the
survey of Christian ministers.
If the case for progressive taxation was uneasy as a matter of economics,
celebrated theologian Reinhold Niebuhr saw taxation as coercion, but “also a
method of supporting his own long-range sense of duty toward the commu-
nity as against a short-range disinclination to do so.” Laws, Niebuhr wrote,
provided an “approximation of a loving community [ . . . ] under conditions of
sin” (Niebuhr 1953: 244).
In the postwar period, the NCC faced a vigorous and new level of opposition
from evangelical Christians and conservative businessmen arguing for a
Christian libertarianism.28 Much of the critique from this branch of Protest-
antism was directed at the welfare state. As one minister wrote in his sermon
contest entry, “The growing acceptance of the philosophy of theWelfare State
is a graver peril to freedom in America today than the threat of military
aggression” (Kruse 2015: 32). James W. Fifield Jr., head of the anti-NCC
Spiritual Mobilization, called out minimumwages, price controls, social secur-
ity pensions, unemployment insurance, veterans’ benefits and a wide range of
federal taxation as “tyrannical” and violative of “natural law.” For the NCC
and its ilk, there was contempt: “Unclothed, their gospel is pure socialism—
they wish to employ the compulsion of the state to force others to act as the
social gospelers think they should act.”
The conflicts over race, the VietnamWar, and President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
War on Poverty and Great Society programs, expanded divisions among
American citizens. Mainline ecumenical NCC and allied local leaders were
instrumental in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 giving greater rights
to African Americans (Risen 2014). It was an attack on the Jim Crow South
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/6/2018, SPi
Mid-Twentieth Century: US Tax Compliance
215
(and Northern practices as well). To fundamentalist and evangelical Protest-
ants, this coerced integration was unacceptable. Many Southerners left the
Democratic Party (which was in part responsible for the Civil Rights Act),
enrolled their children in religiously based unintegrated private academies
and became more rejectionist toward the federal government and its taxes.
It was this rejection of big government taxation and power that fueled the
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.
Superficially, civil religion was no longer even united. Religion came
increasingly to mean evangelical religion, while the mainline NCC churches
lost members and political influence. For fundamentalist and evangelical
Christians, the Republican Party became, in the words of Daniel K. Williams,
God’s Own Party.
Secular conservative movements also began to organize and resist federal
taxation. From Ayn Rand to household employers in Texas to Vivien Kellems,
protests about the level and techniques of federal taxation received a fair
amount of publicity. Even some popular children’s books were not supportive
of the federal government. The Little House on the Prairie books by Laura Ingalls
Wilder do not paint a positive picture of the government. In one of the books
in the series, The Long Winter, Mr. Edwards, a former neighbor, shows up in
South Dakota escaping eastern territories that are “too settled-up.” Mr.
Edwards is portrayed very positively in the series as the savior of the Ingalls’
homestead and the bringer of presents from Santa Claus. Mr. Edwards’ visit
this time, however, is comprised almost entirely of a passionate complaint
against taxation (Ingalls Wilder 1971: 112–13).
Without a compelling and unifying cause for taxation, tax compliance
propaganda in the postwar era morphed from the wartime celebrity and
nongovernmental voices urging patriotic support for the war effort. During
the Truman administration, the shift in public relations emphasis was to
anecdotes about government apprehension of ordinary people. In a Collier’s
article, “They Can’t Fool the Revenue Man,” Undersecretary of the Treasury
A. L. M. Wiggins told of a friend’s challenge to him. “Oh yes, I know you get
most of the big boys. But how about the little fellows? There must be thou-
sands of them who get away with murder every year.” Wiggins went on:
Well, my friend was wrong. Take the case of the man who ran a filling station and
lunch counter on the outskirts of a sizeable city [ . . . ] He figured that he could
chisel a few hundred dollars in income taxes without running any risk. He oper-
ated on a cash basis; how could anyone know how much he took in? [ . . . ]
I estimated that it cost this man about $1,000 to try to evade $300 in taxes.
(Wiggins 1947: 68)
Wiggins did not discuss what it cost the Treasury to pursue this small-time
evasion. The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service warned tax-cheating
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farmers in Minnesota, paperboys, and a delicatessen owner feeding his family
from inventory: “You see, it’s almost impossible to deceive our investigators,
because most of them are generally familiar with every type of tax dodge
ever attempted, and if they run across what appears to be a new one,
they can look into the files and find it’s been tried before” (Schoeneman
1949: 126). Tax evaders could be tripped up by “disgruntled or underpaid
employees,” “unusual currency transactions,” “sudden displays of wealth,”
“hat-check receipts, tips to waiters,” an “estranged and angry wife,” even success
stories in newspapers and magazines (Wiggins 1947: 71). The Treasury’s boasts
about compliance could be seen as assuring ordinary taxpayers that everyone
would pay taxes under the federal income tax. Of course, it was withholding and
third party reporting that did the heavy lifting for the mass income tax.
Conclusion
The earlier emphasis on the wealthy targets of a class tax allowed ordinary
Americans to see a part of the federal revenue system as aimed at those most
able to pay. The establishment of Social Security taxes enabled the govern-
ment to tax average citizens, who, it was thought, would receive direct pay-
ments in exchange for their contributions. During Roosevelt’s New Deal, the
income tax was a class tax directed at the wealthiest Americans. With the
advent of World War II, the image presented was one of Americans’ consent
and unanimity in support of the war effort. Propaganda stressed that taxation
was for this purpose and not for less popular New Deal programs. This story of
purpose was part of the Roosevelt administration’s compliance program—
linking the purpose of taxation to the war and making it clear that all were
paying their fair share.
In the meantime, citizens became more legible to the federal government.
With the introduction of withholding by employers for social security and
bond purchases, the government was able to use third parties to collect taxes
before workers got their “take-home pay.” The expansion in 1943 to with-
holding of income taxes made a mass income tax possible. The amount of
income known to the government and accounts were reconciled on annual
income tax returns with taxpayers identified by social security numbers. For
decades, this very ordinary compliance device has been a foundation of
federal revenues.
As the mass income tax was launched during World War II, agreement on
the aims of taxation supported the transition from class tax to mass tax.
During the immediate postwar period, a period of consensus seemed to be
operating within popular culture with respect to anti-communism and civil
religion, and regarding tax policy. Some of this “convergence” could be
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viewed as the result of the Democratic Party’s de-emphasis on class politics
and its support for a variety of tax cuts (Brownlee 2016).
Beneath this “consensus” were the beginnings of deep divisions about the
size and purposes of federal government, and the role of government as
opposed to other societal institutions. The 1960s exposed societal rifts on
race, gender, sexuality, and America’s role in the world that have continued
to the present day. Evangelical churches have emerged as themost perceptible
religious voices in debates about government, federalism, and morality. The
denominations comprising the social gospel-based NCC are on the decline in
members, in political power, and in budgets. Historian David A. Hollinger in
his Presidential Address to the Organization of American Historians has
argued that the NCC’s support for racial equality and against American adven-
turism abroad created alliances with secular organizations and attitudes that
continue to have societal influence. As Hollinger wrote:
This sympathetic engagement with diversity that has become so visible and
celebrated a feature of the public life of the United States is the product of
many agencies, but prominent among them are the egalitarian impulses and the
capacities for self-interrogation that ecumenical Protestants brought to the great
American encounter with diversity during the middle and late decades of the
twentieth century . . .Our narrative of modern American religious history will be
deficient so long as we suppose that ecumenical Protestantism declined because it
had less to offer the United States than did its evangelical rival. Much of what
ecumenical Protestantism offered now lies beyond the churches, and hence we
have been slow to see it. (Hollinger 2011: 48)
The unifying themes of total war and One Nation Under God may be seen as
diminishing as America fights non-state actors, terror, and itself. Today a
variety of enforcement problems threaten to erode public trust in the compe-
tence and fairness of the Internal Revenue Service. The structure of income
taxation is seen by many to be unfair. The World War II and postwar era did
establish the federal government’s power to collect income and social security
taxes from the waged and salaried masses. But corporations and hedge fund
managers seem to be able to use international entities and to exploit the lower
rates on capital gain income to reduce their effective tax rates in ways not
available to average Americans.
In addition to questioning the fairness of the income tax system, Americans
are divided, in truth very divided, on the purposes to which tax revenues
should be put. The level of social insurance from Social Security, Medicaid,
Medicare, and the Affordable Care Act is under active Congressional debate,
let alone contests over domestic spending, military expenditures, and outlays
for “soft power” abroad. The perceptions of fairness in taxation and a lack
of consensus on the role of government will persist in plaguing the American
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tax system as it continues to collect a majority of its revenues by means
that take many choices about compliance away from wage-earning and
salaried citizens.
Notes
1. See also Mehrotra (2013). In one of the most memorable passages of his writings,
Seligman (1895: 72) argued for a notion of fiscal citizenship.
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9. In 1976, Ronald Reagan told a memorable story:
In Chicago, they found a woman who holds the record. She used 80 names, 30
addresses, 15 telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social Security, vet-
erans’ benefits for four nonexistent deceased veteran husbands, as well as
welfare. Her tax-free income alone has been running $150,000 a year.
While not all of Reagan’s stories would survive fact-checking, this one was based
on Linda Taylor, officially listed as “white as a child, but could pass as black.”
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2013/12/linda_taylor_welfare_
queen_ronald_reagan_made_her_a_notorious_american_villain.html.
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(in Blum 1967: 40, 51).
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16. “To Everyone in the New York Office” (December 11, 1944), Bruce Barton Papers,
State Historical Society of Madison, WI, 70–3.
17. Group Meeting—Taxes (November 27, 1943, 9:30 a.m.), 680 (in Blum 1967: 1160).
18. Pamphlets 1942–3, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208,
National Archives, College Park, MD.
19. Fortnightly Budget for Wartime Editors of Women’s Pages (March 4, 1944) Taxes—
Radio, Program Guides and Publicity Materials for the Economic Stabilization
Campaign, Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208, National
Archives, College Park, MD.
20. Eddie Cantor Program, (OWI Plug) (February 23, 1944) Taxes—Radio, Program
Guides and Publicity Materials for the Economic Stabilization Campaign, Records
of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208, National Archives, College
Park, MD.
21. I. Berlin, “I Paid My Income Tax Today” (December 26, 1941), 480 (in Blum
1967: 83).
22. Letter from Henry Morgenthau Jr. to Irving Berlin (December 30, 1941), 480 (in
Blum 1967: 82).
23. Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78–68, § 6, 57 Stat. 126, 145–9
(1943). http://legisworks.org/congress/78/publaw-68.pdf.
24. Department of Treasury, “Report on Postwar Taxation” (n.d.), 37–8, Blough Papers,
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum, Independence, MO.
25. Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates. www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/
historical-highest-marginal-income-tax-rates.
26. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/
282/101/.
27. Letter from George Werning to Bourke B. Hickenlooper (January 6, 1948), (Tax,
Income, 1948) Bourke B. Hickenlooper Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library,
West Branch, IA.
28. This is well documented in Kruse (2015).
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Romania
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Tax Collection without Consent
State-Building in Romania
Clara Volintiru
In Romanian folklore tax collectors are often portrayed as predators. For
example, Mihail Sadoveanu wrote in his historical novel, Diminet ̦i de Iulie, of
1927: “There was a time when great was the surprise that this people had not
totally disappeared. Like birds of prey, the tax collectors would hover over
them at all times.”1 This is not surprising, as in pre-modern times the level and
use of collected duties tended to have nothing to dowith the citizens’wants or
needs. In response, evading taxes is equally poignant in popular culture, as the
expression for running away literally means escaping taxes (a da bir cu fugit ̦ii).
Romanians’ cognitive framing of paying taxes sheds light on why there is a
low fiscal collection rate to this day. Inefficient and ineffective administration
characterizing this country is traceable to a weak state capacity in early mod-
ern times. In short, Romanian citizens seem to be traditionally “unwilling” to
pay their duties to the state. Nevertheless, the puzzle that this case study
addresses is how this can be, given that our experimental research clearly
shows the opposite. Romanians are in fact inclined to be highly compliant;
but, they do so when the social context involves cooperation mechanisms
such as sharing the money, or acquiescing to the use of the collected sums.
The historical analysis of the Romanian case allows us to look at Romanian
institutions and the behavior of Romanian people, but we cannot trace a
single Romanian state per se in early modern times, given that its territory
was split. Romanians have historically inhabited threemain regions:Wallachia,
Moldavia, and Transylvania. 2018 marks the one hundredth anniversary of the
unification of all these regions. Given foreign influences and the subsequent
development of the state in each of these provinces, this case study presents us
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with a natural experiment of sorts. Austro-Hungarian rule and influence in
Transylvania developed an early bureaucratic system, while the institutional
environment of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia was modeled
in the periphery of the Ottoman Empire. These differences informed the rela-
tionship citizens have with administrative authorities and, to a certain extent,
even after the institutional homogenization of the past century, we can observe
a higher compliance in Transylvania than in the Principalities.2
Both the legitimacy and the authority of fiscal collectors were poor. Two
factors affected their legitimacy: they were representing foreign (i.e. Austro-
Hungarian or Ottoman) powers, and there was a complete lack of correlation
between collection and redistribution. Monetary and in-kind taxes were col-
lected under obligations toward an external beneficiary, while internal sup-
pliers such as ecclesiastical units or local noblemen supplied care or security
functions. This uncoupling of fiscal functions is also reflected in the deficien-
cies of authority: regulations were inconsistent or superfluous, given that they
were designed for a quasi-colony or a periphery state. Overall, the authorities’
capacity to monitor was weak; enforcement was not undertaken in a system-
atic or institutional manner, but rather was discretionary, under the context-
ual burden of external fiscal pressures.
To resolve deficits of legitimacy and institutional capacity, tax collection in
Romanian territories was largely conducted through local intermediaries.
What stands out in this case study is that the Romanian rulers’main involve-
ment in foreign affairs was paying taxes to foreign powers. The sequencing
and the manner in which fiscal revenue was collected (i.e. after it was paid by
the ruler) established a patrimonial system. As such, informal rules and prac-
tices emerged and consolidated over time, especially with regard to the provi-
sion of a basic redistributive system (e.g. hospitals, policing, and dispute
settlement).
An institution whose authority is firmly rooted in informal practices is the
Church. It has acted as an intermediary of administrative and political affairs
since pre-modern times. The Romanian system of redistribution was developed
around the ecclesiastical institutions. Both the Orthodox and the Catholic
Churches were able to extract their own revenues from the general population
and noblemen. Whereas the Catholic Church was much more heavily assimi-
lated in the Austro-Hungarian administrative apparatus, the Orthodox Church
has worked in parallel with any formal administration up until modern times.
It has legitimized rulers and provided cultural, social, and religious services to
the population.
Under a quasi-colonial developmental path, Romanian authorities have not
developed a proper social contract with the people. The tax collection process
has been one of enforcement (to the extent possible), with little rights or
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privileges granted in return. This was especially true in pre-modern times, but
also largely applicable to the administrative reforms of themonarchy, or those
of the authoritarian communist regime, throughout the twentieth century.
While redistribution significantly increased over the modern period, the
internalization of cooperation logic between taxpayers and the state did not
occur. As far as general social norms go, we find Romanians, much like
Italians, presenting strong personal values of honesty and compliance, but
poor trust in institutions.3
Why Use Historical Analysis in the Romanian Case Study?
A large amount of literature exists on the contemporary failures of the Romanian
state. In addressing the quality and legitimacy of state authorities in Romania,
several studies have explained contemporary state incapacity in terms of post-
communist transitional legacies (Ban 2014; Light and Phinnemore 2001; Pop
2006; Stan 2009; Stan and Vancea 2015).
In this field of studies, some authors have looked at the political actors and
the institutionalization of the party system (Light and Phinnemore 2001;
Mungiu-Pippidi 2002; Stan 2009; Volintiru 2012). Others have focused on
disruptive shifts in the Romanian political economy (Ban 2014; Gabor 2010;
Pop 2006). Such studies reflect a process of post-transitional consolidation
framed by a wider comparative literature on new democracies (Ban 2016;
Dimitrov, Goetz, and Wollmann 2006; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Linz and Stepan
1996). They reveal the formation of poor contemporary expectations from the
state, and implicitly, citizens’ low tax morale (see Todor’s analysis of the post-
communist tax system in Chapter 11 in this volume).
Given this wealth of arguments on why Romanians are unlikely to trust
their state, and consequently pay their taxes, the question is why we should
look further back to pre-modern times to explain this behavior. The answer is
because Romanians have faced an uncoupling of the functions of collection
and redistribution since early modern times. As I show here, this historical
separation between collection and redistribution has made people less willing
to take “the leap of faith” even when circumstances improve. Furthermore,
the historical variation in institutional capacity between regions informs
people’s behavior to this day. If anything, the most systematic statist redistri-
bution of public goods and services occurred in the twentieth century. This
has notmanaged, though, to change Romanians’ perception of administrative
institutions as extractive bodies (and just that).
The historical analysis pursued in this chapter provides us with several key
insights into why Romanian institutions never managed to build contingent
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consent—a close connection between taxpaying and public goods or services.
As foreign powers have directly or indirectly ruled the Romanian territories,
developing a systematic tax collection capacity was not a priority. Conse-
quently, Romanian citizens did not get much back from the state, and the
Church intervened to provide much-needed welfare goods. This situation
contrasts with the Swedish case where the Church intervened to consolidate
the collection capacity of the state (see Nistotskaya and D’Arcy, Chapter 2 in
this volume). The balance of power between administrative and ecclesiastical
authorities in Romania is more like the competition logic of the Italian
Church (see Hien, Chapter 4 in this volume), even though it was not compet-
ing for collected resources (as in the Italian case), but just for legitimacy or
moral authority.
Much like everywhere else, the tax collection process in Romania has been
linked to the dynamics of international power relations. Throughout their
history the Romanian Principalities have been ruled or dominated by larger
regional powers. Since pre-modern times, the duties and obligations shared
between national elites (i.e. local rulers and notables) and foreign powers (e.g.
the Hungarian Kingdom, Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, and
Russian Empire) have had a decisive effect on the manner in which revenues
were collected.
More importantly, the dynamic of these power relations had a determining
role in how the extracted revenues were to be spent: they were not redistrib-
uted. This in turn affected the expectations of taxpayers. As the Romanians
harbored low expectations of redistribution and negative perceptions of tax
collectors, a vicious circle of low compliance (given the opportunity) has been
formed and has persisted to the present day. Furthermore, low expectations of
redistribution, although engineered by foreign administrators, have been
maintained in later years by domestic elites.
We thus find the emergence of a patrimonial system that was being sup-
ported by the international balance of power. Foreign powers, which did not
wish to engage in the direct administration of Romanian territories, encour-
aged a bilateral relationship with rulers, while formally recognizing the rights
and privileges of the citizens (mostly as a leverage against the rulers). Conse-
quently, there was only a marginal preoccupation with systematically collect-
ing taxes from citizens, as rulers relied predominantly on their own personal
fortunes and foreign creditors. Secondly, the historical setting of Romanian
territories allowed for a consolidation of informal practices, especially in terms
of redistribution. There were few regulatory provisions, most of which in turn
derived from foreign systems (e.g. Ottoman law). Extended regulatory provi-
sions on the systematic delivery of public goods and services were introduced
later, tentatively in the eighteenth and more specifically in the nineteenth
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century (see, for example, the Organic Statute, discussed below in “Taxes,
intermediaries, and bureaucratic genesis”). The Church provided informally
most of such services as medical care (bolnit ̦e), education, and dispute
settlement.
In the Romanian case study we find little evidence of a direct relationship
between citizens and the state as we would define it under a social contract
rationale. Instead, we find a high reliance on intermediaries to ensure admin-
istrative processes. Throughout the early modern period, most administrative
institutions have been constructs of foreign powers, based on diplomatic
relations or contextual interests. This “captive” status of the Romanians, in
between semi-colonial and autonomous rule, consolidated the power of infor-
mal practices as constant benchmarks of conduct and practice. Acquiring the
consent of taxpayers, or convincing them to cooperate with the state to solve
collective problems was not the framing upon which tax collection was
developed here (as opposed to Sweden, for example; see Nistotskaya and
D’Arcy, Chapter 2 in this volume). Instead, a pyramidal system of enforced
collection was the prevalent practice.
Both state capacity to extract resources and the availability of resources are
relevant in the process of fiscal collection. Historical sources tend to showcase
Transylvania as having a higher administrative capacity and more (taxable)
resources, while the Romanian Principalities lacked both. This is not entirely
so. The economic development of the regions varied extensively over pre-
modern times, which means that institutional evolution played a major role
in the tax collection capacity of each region.
When looking at urbanization levels as a measure of economic develop-
ment there is no distinguishable developmental pattern for the Ottoman-
controlled Romanian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia on the one
hand, and Transylvania on the other.4 If anything, both in the sixteenth
century and as late as the eighteenth century, Moldavia was more like
Transylvania than Wallachia, which had a higher urbanization rate,
similar to that of other European countries such as Denmark or Ireland
(Murgescu 2010).
Transylvania did indeed grow, but slowly and steadily on a basis of gradual
urbanization, and in such communities monitoring and administrative reach
was easier. In the case of Wallachia, like other European economies of the
time, the main economic driver was an increase in agricultural productivity
(e.g. the introduction of corn crops) (Murgescu 2010: 94–9). In Moldavia, the
sharp increase in urbanization in the eighteenth century can be attributed to a
preferential fiscal regime from the Ottomans, given the Russian Empire’s
expansion in the area. It is therefore a story of institutions and not one of
economic endowment.
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Legitimacy and Social Expectations on Redistribution
Romanians had a shifting image of the state throughout pre-modern times.
Autonomy alternated with dependency; the conditions of dependence alter-
nated as well. The Ottomans, for example, provided no clear, predictable
expectations of the relationship between center and periphery, as they treated
each province differently (Barkey 2008). Hungarian rule was more institution-
alized, but it gave way to Ottoman domination in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries in Transylvania. Whether it was through military action,
fiscal compliance, or strategically developed trade relations, the Romanians
have been in a perpetual process of redefining the limits of authority and the
duties owed.
While enduring a prolonged state-building process, Romanians experienced
a steady development of informal institutions and social norms (e.g. feudal
relations, ecclesiastical community norms). These were consolidated by iter-
ations and confirmations through practice. Because of the constancy and
predictability of such community-based norms of sharing and creating public
goods and services, along with the legitimacy of their promoters (e.g. local
lords or priests), Romanian behavior was shaped by the (ever-changing) regu-
lations of informal rather than formal institutions. Gretchen Helmke and
Steven Levitsky assert that informal institutions can often have a profound
and systematic effect on political outcomes, and scholars “who fail to consider
these informal rules of the game risk missing many of the most important
incentives and constraints that underlie political behavior” (2004: 725).
Romanian systems of collection and redistribution were mentioned in for-
mal decrees, but the manner in which the duties were fulfilled was not. An
extensive, carefully detailed literature covers the Ottoman fiscal system (Darling
1996; Fischer-Galati 1959; Karaman and Pamuk 2010; Panaite 2013), and
through this we can find important details on collection (not so much redistri-
bution) in Romanian Principalities (e.g. how much was owed and on what
basis, frequency, to whom and by whom the payments were delivered).
It is, however, a mirrored perspective, as we find out from Ottoman sources
how things (were supposed to have) happened. When we look at fragments of
domestic historical records in Romanian territories, the regulatory image
becomes blurred by domestic, ad hoc practices and means of implementation
(e.g. monetary approximations, in-kind compensations, substantial annual
variations, and off-the-books payments).
Similarly, while we can find detailed accounts of fiscal administration in
Hungary (Bonney 1999), it is much less clear how resilient administrative
practices were in Transylvania after it fell under Ottoman influence, or how
rural areas compared to urban centers.
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For example, Richard Bonney raises the question of informal consolidation
of practices in tax collection, as he asserts: “fiscal systems have always been
with us, but . . . the ‘fiscal state’ was not” (1999: 2). If we look at the historical
formal and informal institutions shaping fiscal compliance (or lack thereof) in
Romanian territories, we need look no further than the legitimacy and author-
ity of tax collectors. A domestic fiscal state (see Levi 1988; Migdal 2001;
Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1992) was not characteristic of the Romanian collection
system, the extractive role being fulfilled by foreign states. As such, the effect-
iveness of fiscal collection relied on the degree to which domestic agents or
intermediaries were recognized themselves as legitimate or authoritarian.
Romanians’ perceptions on the legitimacy of fiscal duties were significantly
influenced by the fact that these were external impositions. The Romanian
Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were politically dependent on the
Ottoman Empire throughout the entire pre-modern period.5 Transylvania had
been annexed to Hungary in the eleventh century and fell under Ottoman
rule in the sixteenth century, under similar conditions to the other Romanian
territories. It was not until the eighteenth century that the Austro-Hungarian
administration model became systematically implemented in Transylvania.
Some of the main historical Romanian studies treat the territories under
Austro-Hungarian influence separately from those under Ottoman influence
(see e.g. Murgescu 1996; 2012). I am, however, resisting this approach, as the
fiscal system bears similar limitations (with lasting effects): foreign authority
(i.e. an external collector), lack of correlation between tax collection and
redistributive benefits (i.e. national suppliers) and an overall poor institutional
capacity—both for monitoring and enforcement, especially in the predomin-
antly rural areas. The distinguishing element that is of main interest to the
present analysis is that the administrative capacity of monitoring and system-
atic enforcement, as well as the delivery of public services (i.e. contingent
consent) were implemented sooner in Transylvania via Austro-Hungarian
influence than they were in the Principalities. This in turn shaped citizens’
perceptions and expectations.
Taxes, intermediaries, and bureaucratic genesis
When looking at the early modern period, “due to high shares of intermediar-
ies, Ottoman revenues lagged behind those of other states in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries” (Karaman and Pamuk 2010: 593). Obviously, using
intermediaries was not restricted to Ottoman practices. England, for example,
used appointed commissionaires to collect and evaluate taxes in exchange for a
fee or commission, while Sweden used the Lutheran Church as agents of tax
collection and monitoring. The latter was more successful on grounds of
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legitimacy and territorial penetration. According to historical records, the rulers
of the Romanian Principalities were seen as tax intermediaries themselves.
Land tax was the predominant fiscal revenue up until modern times. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the village was still a “collective fiscal
unit,” meaning that the entire community was responsible for land taxes,
called cisluire (Lupan 1937: 11). Beyond limited collection capacity, other
drivers of this indiscriminate approach were the high capacity of community
leaders to maintain order, and a sense of equity. The small, agrarian commu-
nities had a high level of informal monitoring or self-regulation driven by
local authority figures (e.g. priests, local lords). Furthermore, because the land
tax was one of the main sources of fiscal collection, the Ottomans would
frequently use the status of “protected lands” for the Romanian principalities
to ensure their territorial integrity. This in turn implied the safeguarding of the
property rights of nobles and churches with large land holdings, paying their
taxes in a predictable manner. An incipient social contract was formed
between domestic elites and foreign powers.
As weak as monitoring was in comparison toWestern European countries of
the time, there were some administrative instruments of oversight worth
acknowledging. Given theWestern influence, Transylvania started to develop
bureaucratic monitoring in pre-modern times (e.g. cadastral records, life
events, judicial decisions on debts and duties). With the frequent administra-
tive changes in Wallachia and Moldavia Principalities, and the high level of
illiteracy, the Church’s census records here were much more reliable than the
administrative ones. Most of the peasantry would be highly compliant with
ecclesiastical procedures of life events such as birth, marriage, and death.
The lasting effect of this largely informal overseeing of tax payments is
that neither the state’s monitoring capacity (e.g. cadaster records, census
data) nor the overall approach to tax enforcement has improved significantly
in modern times. We can see the interpretative nature of the evaluation of
taxpayers’ income for fiscal purposes, even on the eve of the contemporary
statist structure: “when the lifestyle of a taxpayer shows a discrepancy with
known incomes, fiscal authorities can recur to evaluation according to hints
and assumptions” [in Romanian, emphasis in the original text] (Madgearu
2014: 88).
Most of the administrative constructs of the Romanian state were “impro-
visations based on random practices in Europe” (Rădulescu-Motru 2012
[1937]: 6; see also Janos 1989). In the early twelfth century, court positions
occupied by local noblemen or boyars (boieri) were Slavonic constructs (e.g.
logofat̆, pharnic, spat̆ar, ban), having a ceremonial role rather than an official
function (such as responsibility for stocks, or the armory). They further
became territorially bound in judete̦ (the Latin term for county) after the
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Orthodox alignment with the Western branch of Christianity. Following the
Unification of the two Romanian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia
in 1859, French administrative structures were imported as well (e.g. Prefec-
tures).6 In a noteworthy analysis in the early twentieth century, Constantin
Dobrogeanu-Gherea (1910: 29) underlines the tensions between Western
institutional imports and the socio-economic realities of Romania: “the peas-
ants did not request the introduction of liberal capitalist institutions, but
rather the suppression of serfdom; they would have been sooner satisfied
with an absolutist monarchy or a ruler [Voda ̆ in the original] liberating it
from serfdom [ioba ̆gie in the orginal].”
The dependency of administrative development upon contextual con-
straints continued during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Legal
Codes were introduced inWallachia andMoldavia, integrating existing informal
practices with former Byzantine concepts of law.7 These state-building efforts
brought all the Romanian territories to a more consistent level of institutional
development. Still, these reforms were essentially driven by the rulers’ desires
to increase and extend tax collection as much as possible (Ghica 2014 [1880]).
Later, in the nineteenth century,8 the Organic Statute (Regulamentul
Organic) introduced the first common legislative framework for both Princi-
palities, under the Russian protectorate. It built heavily on existing adminis-
trative and judicial practices, but under the direction of the Russian
administrator Kiseleff they were formalized and homogenized, while “striving
to prevent abuses.”9 The Statute delineated for the first time the internal
engagement of the state to provide public goods and services such as roads,
street lighting, cleaning and signage, fire stations, policing and prisons, med-
ical personnel, healthcare centers, schools, regulation of pharmaceutical sup-
pliers, and various judicial and administrative functions. More significantly to
the present study, the Organic Statute specifically included the “establishment
for the first time in the Romanian countries of a regulated centralized account-
ancy system that would ensure the checks over the duties collected by state
agents, and create a formal framework for the provision of pension, as
opposed to the discretionary decision of the ruler as before.”10
While legal scholars argue that no constitutional foundations existed before
the Organic Statute, historians point to the existence of approximately twelve
versions of legal references framing the administration of rule of Wallachia
and Moldavia, as well as the provision of “common good” (binele obștesc) that
the rulers were supposed to safeguard (Barbu 2000).
Subsequently, increasingly fervent nationalist emancipation movements
established international connections with neighboring organizations, such
as the Greek Anti-Ottoman revolutionary society Etaireia. Nationalist Rom-
anian movements imported many demands regarding citizens’ rights and
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administration procedures from them, constructing the modern framings of
state legitimacy.11
The Church as a redistribution agent
The Romanian case study shows that, over many centuries, most state and
Orthodox Church functions have been interlinked (Stan and Turcescu 2011).
One of the fundamental organizational principles derived from the Orthodox
Church’s Byzantine past is the theocratic notion of symphonia—taken tomean
harmony between Church and state. This relationship developed steadily as
the Church became an essential vehicle for nationalist movements serving “as
an important transmission belt from state to society, implementing an agenda
of domestic integration and homogenization” (Van Meurs and Mungiu-
Pippidi 2010: xiii).
The existence of the Orthodox Church under the Ottoman Empire was
readily encouraged by the Sultans. It was regarded as a means to control the
vassal populations and to help in the collection of taxes (tribut), given the
informal authority of the clergy and the already well-organized network of
monasteries. Additionally, as non-believers, the South-Eastern European
populations were charged a higher tribute or tax (harac-i maktu) to preserve
the autonomy of their territories (Panaite 2013: 403). Collection of the annual
per capita tax (cizye) owed by non-Muslims in Wallachia and Moldavia was
overseen by the same Ottoman treasurer (baș defterdar) (Darling 1996: 75).12
While the Byzantine Empire subsidized the activity of all Orthodox clergy
(Zachariadou 2006), revenue sources changed under Ottoman rule. In order to
maintain its day-to-day activities, the Orthodox Church developed a taxation
system, complementary to that of the state:
The collection of these taxes was a privilege granted by the sultans, who appar-
ently continued the Byzantine tax, known as the kanonikon, levied on the inhab-
itants, the priests and the monasteries of a region in order to cover the expenses of
their metropolitan bishop. (Zachariadou 2006: 179)
Much like in Italy, competition was created at this stage between the Church
and the administration in the collection of taxes (see Hien, Chapter 4 in this
volume, on the Italians’ contributions to the Catholic Church). Still, local
nobility worked closely with the ecclesiastical elites as their legitimacy was
codependent. Tax collection was thus not impeded but actually facilitated by
this cooperation.
In exchange, the Church enjoyed a wide range of privileges. For example,
records from the rule of Constantin Brâncoveanu in Wallachia show the
numerous tax exemptions the Principality enjoyed (Zachariadou 2006).
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As taxes in the seventeenth centurywere largely paid in kind,monasterieswere
not only exempted from giving a proportion of their production (e.g. wine,
honey) to the state, but were also allowed to trade in these goods by establish-
ing selling points, such as wine cellars.13 These fiscal privileges coupled with
the autonomy it enjoyed, generated significant wealth for the Church.
Fiscal burdens owed to foreign powers increased markedly at the beginning
of the seventeenth century, especially in Wallachia. Consequently, many free
peasants started to lose their status, selling off any property they might have
had, and becoming “dependents” on the estates of some local lords, but
predominantly on those of monasteries (Murgescu 2010: 40).
While the external fiscal burden on the Romanian Principalities increased,
the number of new monasteries that were being established continued to
grow. By the fifteenth century, all of the main Romanian territories had a
similar number of monasteries, but in the following centuries many more
monasteries were being established in Wallachia and Moldavia (Table 10.1).
Historical records show the provision of public services in both Catholic and
Orthodox monasteries. The latter increased their provision of social services
significantly: hospitals (bolnit ̦e), educational centers (from primary schools to
academies, e.g. Sâmbăta de Sus), printing presses (e.g. at Trei Ierarhi), orphan-
ages, elderly care centers, and the supply of food and clothing for the poor.
Local churches would assume many informal care-giving functions, but did
not possess the personnel and physical infrastructure (e.g. buildings, land)
that the monasteries did.
After the Unification of the two Romanian Principalities in the nineteenth
century, the state took over the wealth of themonasteries (secularizarea averilor
mâna ̆stires ̦ti). Subsequently, much as in the aftermath of the Reformation in
England and Sweden in the sixteenth century, the Church became an agent of
the national state. Furthermore, it created a very important class for the years
to come: the peasant landowner. This notion of property for the lower classes
was quintessential in the subsequent exercise of tax collection.
Table 10.1. Number of newly established monasteries in Romanian territories
15th century and earlier 16th century 17th century 18th century
Moldavia 12 23 21 13
Transylvania 14 0 15 12
Wallachia 20 28 35 18
Total 46 51 71 43
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Romanian Orthodox Church (BOR) archival records, Archives of Hungary,
www.archivportal.hu/en/archives-of-hungary/archives-of-the-romanian-orthodox-church/. Small ecclesiastical
centers are excluded; both Catholic and Orthodox monasteries have been accounted for in the table.
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The Romanian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia:
Fiscal Responsibilities and Payment Mechanisms
Periphery status and contractual legitimacy
The entire economic exchanges of Wallachia and Moldavia in the sixteenth
century were driven by their fiscal duties to the central government of
the Ottoman Empire: “Romanian products were being exported south of the
Danube, or towards Western Europe . . . through fiscal duties these trade net-
works were filling the coffers of the rulers who in turn used them to pay to the
Ottomans” (Murgescu 1996: 313). Furthermore, while fiscal duties changed
yearly (depending on the internal constraints of the Ottoman Empire) the
responsibility of fulfilling them lay with the appointed ruler.
A reciprocal legal relationship existed between the core and semi-periphery:
Romanian territories have been (at times) “tributary states” (i.e. owing tribute—
both levies and gifts, military and foreign policy support) as well as “protected
states” (i.e. Ottomans owed military and foreign policy support, and could
interfere in internal matters in the interest of Romanians) (Panaite 2013). In
order to safeguard their fiscal base in these territories, the Ottomans adopted
“specific measures designed to ensure the protection and stability of the
[vassal] population in Wallachia, but also other sources of revenues, like
customs, salt mines and the taxation on the grazing of animals belonging to
people south of Wallachia” (D. Panaitescu 2014: 60). The Ottoman Empire’s
central government used its protection responsibilities to confirm or redraw
its support for the rulers’ actions and property rights. It did so inMoldavia and
Wallachia to a considerably greater extent than in Transylvania.
The Ottoman central government would thus provide a sense of legitimacy
to the tax collection process: as long as subjects paid their taxes owed to the
Sultan, their rights and property would be safeguarded, even against the
oppression of their own ruler. To this end the official demands would “often
invoke the fundamental role of the ruler to protect the life, the property, and
the wellbeing of the inhabitants of Wallachia, Moldavia or Transylvania, as
subjects of the sultan” (Panaite 2013: 419).
The common framing of taxes as “recognition gifts” (tribut) created an
ambiguous framing of underlying contractual provisions due to fluid power
relations between the Romanian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia on
the one hand, and the Ottoman Empire on the other hand. Duties paid
on time ensured that the Ottomans would not invade the “autonomous”
Romanian Principalities’ territories, but the latter were still heavily dependent
in economic and diplomatic matters on the former. In turn, the Ottomans
enjoyed minimal costs in administrating these territories, and no responsibil-
ity for developing institutions or enforcing compliance on a geographically
dispersed population.
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Tax collectors and duties owed
According to the system of appointment by the Sultan, the rulers were directly
responsible for the payment of duties owed. They would thus, for their own
sake, secure the annual payments, often taking out loans to top up the yearly
collection. Some historical records refer to the rulers ofWallachia andMoldavia
as “leaseholders of duties” (arendași ai tributului) (as in the chronicle of the
Ottoman bureaucrat Tursun Beg in Panaite 2013: 403). The Principalities were
consequently ruled in an openly patrimonial manner, whether by local lords
(i.e. voievozi or domni) or Greek rulers imposed by the Ottomans.14
According to the seventeenth-century chronicler, Grigore Ureche, starting
in the sixteenth century inMoldavia and the seventeenth century inWallachia,
governors were appointed to take on administrative duties, such as collecting
taxes (Ureche 2011). This arrangement reflected the relative detachment rulers
and boieri had towards this source of income. As Pippidi notes:
The political organization of Moldavia and Wallachia appeared centralized and
despotic, yet real administrative power was weak. The state was conceived as
an extended household . . .Members of the ruling class, including hired foreign
experts in fiscal matters and administration, were seen as servants of the prince
and were promoted for reasons of nepotism or simple favouritism, not as free men
who had consented to a contractually limited obligation to serve the state.
(2010: 119)
Under the rule of Constantin Brâncoveanu, Wallachia enjoyed considerable
freedom in international affairs, both in terms of trade and diplomatic rela-
tions with Transylvania and other Western countries, such as the Italian city
states of the time. It was during this rule that the first systematic inventory
of fiscal duties and debt was created—the “Registry of Wallachia’s Treasury
during the Time of Constantin Brâncoveanu.”15 This registry covered all types
of tax and repaid loans, so that we can disentangle the mechanisms employed
by rulers to pay their duties to the Ottomans. On average, a quarter of the
duties were supplied on site, from local creditors in Istanbul, as the ruler
or his representatives would arrive to pay the annual duties to the Sublime
Porte (Table 10.2).
Even though he possessed a large personal fortune, Brâncoveanu still relied
(like his predecessors) on Istanbul-based loan sharks. Some of themwereMuslim
guild leaders (e.g. the leader of the butchers’ guild, Casap-basa̦, or the leader of
the furriers guild, Mehment Celebi Chirchiu-basa̦16), while others were Ortho-
dox noblemen and tradesmen. This dependency of Romanian rulers on third
parties (i.e. lenders) to fulfill their fiscal duties to the Ottoman Empire illustrates
clearly the lack of sustainability of the domestic fiscal collection system.
Given that the loans bore considerable annual interest, their proportion of
73.72 percent out of the total amount paid to the Sublime Porte in 1702
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reveals the fiscal burden as disproportionate. This high debt share is striking,
especially since total duties were half of what they were the previous year. It
confirms the wide variations of domestic collection capacity, as well as the
level of spending by the ruler.
Brâncoveanu cut several taxes for tradesmen and Church duties. He
invested at the same time in the development of many administrative and
ecclesiastical centers. He pursued the development of a semi-autonomous
state in Wallachia (with redistributive functions) by balancing increasingly
stronger (economic) ties with the West with duties owed to the Ottomans.
Ambitious as his reforms were, the contextual circumstances were not in his
favor. Along with his four sons, he was decapitated in Istanbul in 1714 after all
their fortunes had been confiscated. There was both domestic and foreign
opposition to his endeavors to change the status quo of Wallachia at that
time. Brâncoveanu’s reforms are important because it was the first time that
a social contract was tentatively developed between a Romanian ruler and
his subjects.
From the early eighteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth
century, the Ottoman Empire appointed lords of Greek origin in the vassal
Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia called Phanar Lords. These were
usually promoted from previous positions (dragomani) of interpreters (i.e.
intermediaries) or officials, and as such were trusted by the Sultan to serve
his pecuniary interests in these territories. They also had to pay for such
appointments, with the highest bid usually successful. They would promote
their own patronage networks of power, using lower ranking dignitaries
Table 10.2. Duties and loans in Wallachia (1694–1703)
Year Repaid loans Total duties paid to
the Sublime Porte
Sum in Thalers
(silver coins)
Percentage of
Total Payments
Sum in Thalers
(silver coins)
1694 35,533 10.62% 334,554
1695 33,554 8.73% 384,478
1696 44,960 11.22% 400,574
1697 45,189 13.93% 324,484
1698 112,675 30.34% 371,422
1699 100,688 37.37% 269,447
1700 52,900 13.74% 385,134
1701 203,722 41.55% 490,342
1702 180,290 73.72% 244,570
1703 184,980 27.88% 663,591
Total 994,491 25.71% 3,868,596
Source: Based on data from the Registry of Wallachia Treasury, Berza 1958, quoted in
Murgescu 2012: 118, adapted by the author.
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whom they trusted, to the detriment of the more established local noblemen
(boieri) of the Principalities.17 Generally, such rulers used power to enrich
themselves—given the predictably short timeframe, and serving at the pleas-
ure of the Sultan. Some even absconded with most of the national budget
(visteria) after finding out about their imminent dismissal. Ion Voda ̆ Caradja
emptied Wallachia’s coffers when he ran away to Pisa in 1818, after tripling
his personal fortune by selling noble titles and some of the national salt mines
(Ghica 2014 [1880]).
Formal and informal systems of payment
Throughout the pre-modern period, formal records indicate that the Roma-
nian Principalities (and Transylvania in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries)
owed three types of tax to the Ottomans. Haraci or tribut refer to the collective
duties owed yearly by a given province via its ruler. Pes ̦cheș or plocon refer to
dedicated payments to the Sultan or various high dignitaries for personal use
(e.g. securing the throne) or domestic interests (e.g. representing legal interests
in international negotiations) of the ruler. Finally, there were payments in
support of military campaigns that would go either to the Sublime Porte for
subsequent distribution, or directly where they were needed (e.g. the Crimea).
Under the rule of Brâncoveanu (1654–1714) the relative distribution was as
follows: a third were the collective duties (haraci) and goodwill payments for
the Sultan and his close circle (plocon de bairam); a third were formal bribes or
payments to obtain favors from Ottoman officials (plocon); and a third were
military support payments.18
Rulers were normally selected domestically, from amongst and by the dig-
nitary boyars, but sometimes informal payments were made to ensure patron-
age from Ottoman officials (rușefet) (Murgescu 1996: 215). While pes ̦cheș or
plocon were forms of bribe made transparently and recorded, rușefet was made
“under the table” in a personalizedmanner, bypassing domestic deliberations.
Anecdotal accounts from the sixteenth century suggest a bid-like system,
where one contender, Mihnea Turcitul, offered one million gold coins, while
the other, Petru Cercel, offered 1.16 million coins (Murgescu 1996: 215).
Considering that collective duties for that period ranged between 50,000
and 70,000 gold coins annually, we can see the disproportionate size of
these informal payments for which we have no systematic coverage.
With a vast territory, predominantly agrarian land, and a small community
social structure, the local noblemen or boyars (boieri) were important figures of
authority in the Romanian Principalities, mediating the obligations of sub-
jects with the responsibilities of the ruler. This can be traced to a patrimonial
legal structure: the system of property rights over land and the people living
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on and working that land, as well as the benefits they were required to give
in return, such as housing.19 Noblemen thus realized the basic functions of a
fiscal system: they collected the duties, and provided protection and benefits
in return to the population.
More importantly still, the strong institutionalization of local authorities
originates in local elites. The average rule lasted only about three years (Pippidi
2010: 19). In contrast, the boyars were more resistant to change, andmanaged
to ensure their rights and privileges in an organized manner; it was from
amongst them that Romanian rulers were usually selected.
Taxes paid to local dignitaries—whether administrative (i.e. delegated
boyars) or ecclesiastical (i.e. the bishops and clergy in monasteries)—were
mostly in kind. They in turn had to deliver both in-kind and monetary taxes
to the representatives of the Ottoman Empire. An example of an annual duty
to the Sultan would have been carried by the leading noblemen to Constan-
tinople: “as a sign of our obedience, the ruler will make sure to send to the
Sublime Porte, by way of two Moldavian boieri, 4,000 Turkish ducati, 11,000
piasters, 40 hawks, 40 gestate mares—all as a gift [original in Romanian]”
(Ureche 2011).
Between the eleventh and eighteenth centuries frequent taxation systems
on the population were joint labor (i.e. an extended family was collectively
taxed) in exchange for working on the land (claca ̆) (e.g. for four days a
week20) or a tenth of produce (dijma). The latter was often specific to each
of the major production sectors (e.g. vina ̆rit for wine producers or oierit for
livestock). In the pre-modern period, bearing similarities to a tax farming
system, various categories of collector were established based on the type of
duties or levies they were charged with collecting. Historical records also
show specialized collectors for products such as fruits (ga ̆blari), agricultural
products ( ga ̆letari), or hay ( fânari). Along with labor contributions, in-kind
levies were collected by people from local rural communities. In contrast,
monetary levies collected by such appointees as birari or da ̆bilari were the
responsibility of early versions of clerks, often situated in more affluent
urban communities.
As experienced tradesmen, Greek rulers would often impose heavy duties on
certain desirable imports from the Austro-Hungarian Romanian territories
(e.g. strong liquor). They thereby ensured their own monopoly and maxi-
mized their personal profits. Previous Romanian rulers had gone out of their
way to liberalize such trade across the borders of the Romanian territories; an
example is Constantin Brâncoveanu’s decision to lift taxes on wine traders
from Braso̦v—a city on the border with Transylvania.21 Trade liberalization
was key to both the maximization of the fiscal base and the consolidation of
links across Romanian territories.
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Transylvania and the Early Development
of Administrative Capacity
Collection and redistribution
Under Austro-Hungarian rule a public administration system was developed
in Transylvania.22 Becker and colleagues argue that the shared formal rules of
local communities and the “well-respected administration increased citizens’
trust in local public services” (2015: 40). The Austro-Hungarian Empire pro-
vided various public goods in exchange for the taxes collected, such as
bridges,23 road infrastructure, and stable administrative practices.
In the early thirteenth century, we find in the Austro-Hungarian territories
“truth courts” (loca credibilia) run by both the judiciary and the (Catholic)
Church, signifying that formal bureaucratic institutions had an earlier history
in this region. By contrast, Wallachia and Moldavia relied at this time much
more heavily on feudal rule.
By comparison to the formalism and uncertainty of the fiscal contract with
the Ottomans, under the Hungarian annexation, citizens’ expectations were
more clearly constructed. Responsibilities were no longer placed solely on the
ruler, the delegated figures of authority having a clearer mandate. However, as
late as the nineteenth century, enforcement and monitoring mechanisms
were not very effective: tax collection would involve troops who would
occupy “entire villages, search the houses of delinquent taxpayers, and pro-
ceed to remove anything of value” ( Janos 1989: 340).
Much like elsewhere in Central Europe at that time, Transylvanian citizens
were called upon to contribute in order to support ongoingmilitary campaigns.
In the fifteenth century, various taxes were proposed with the specific purpose
of financing offensives against the Ottomans or standing armies (Bonney 1999:
266). The legitimacy of such taxes would have been higher than those collected
in the Romanian Principalities, as the taxpayers would also be direct beneficiar-
ies (i.e. from a security provision). Their usage was nevertheless very limited.
Given the same population, with the same level of development, over
certain periods there was a much better correlation between the extractive
and redistributive functions of the fiscal system. Transylvanian taxpayers also
had the advantage of their proximity to Western markets, thus creating more
flourishing urban centers with a sharp increase of urbanization in the seven-
teenth century. The development of existing urban centers, alongside sup-
porting administrative services, had been pursued actively in previous
centuries by the policies promoted during the Hungarian annexation of the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (under, for example, KingMathias Corvinus).
After the decline of the Hungarian Kingdom, much of the administrative
system was overshadowed by Ottoman law. The still predominantly agrarian
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population subsequently suffered the same fate as that in the Romanian
Principalities, becoming trapped by exploitative land-owning elites (Janos
1989: 335).
Duties owed and resources
The Romanian territories found themselves under single rule for a brief period
in 1600, under Michael the Brave.24 Under his rule, the issue of finances
became very important and informed the actions that led to unification. At
a time when debt had reached a record level, Michael the Brave’s decision to
rebel against the Ottoman Empire “while risky, . . .was nevertheless reasonable
from an economic point of view” (Murgescu 1996: 251). Michael duly lever-
aged his military position of fighting against the Ottomans to ensure financial
support from Western powers. Historical records contain evidence of this in
his correspondence (in Latin) with such Hungarian intermediaries of Emperor
Rudolf II as Nicholas Puffy and Bartholomeus Pezzen (Murgescu 2012: 46).
There was a marked increase in fiscal burdens in the sixteenth century
(see Table 10.2): “relatively limited in Transylvania, considerable in Moldavia,
and extreme inWallachia . . . the comparison to other [European] states shows
unequivocally the exceptional nature of this increase before 1594” (Murgescu
2010: 39). This benefited the people of Transylvania asmuch as it did its rulers,
because the system here was much more effective in extracting its due share.
Also, rulers in Transylvania never had a sense of autonomy—being previously
annexed by the Kingdom of Hungary—as the rulers of the Principalities
constantly strived for.
If we account only for per capita monetary duties, we would find Wallachia
on a level with the Venetian state. Nevertheless, we can see that a heavier fiscal
burden was felt in Wallachia if we look at in-kind taxation: 134 kilos of
wheat per capita. Bearing a similarly large agricultural capacity, Transylvania
was only taxed 40 kilos of wheat per capita (Table 10.3). Overall, Transylva-
nian duties, both monetary and in-kind, were in line with those within the
Ottoman Empire.
In comparison to the other Romanian territories, Transylvania benefited in
several unique ways. Firstly, the province possessed significant resources of
precious metals, and aspri silver coins were produced in large quantities here
throughout the sixteenth century. Secondly, it benefited from an increasingly
advantageous exchange rate over the years. Transylvania predominantly
used coins of Hungarian circulation (e.g. florins), as opposed to the Ottoman
dinar that was experiencing faster depreciation. Thirdly, fiscal collections
in Transylvania had less to do with diplomatic affairs. Rulers of the Romanian
Principalities had the additional burden of the high value of bribe payments
(plocon or peșches ̦) to secure their rule and their borders. Transylvania was
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much more clearly placed under the protection of Hungary, with which it
shared its fate in good and bad times. As such, fiscal collection here wasmainly
about funding adminstrative and military expenses, similar to the Western
bureacratic system.
The introduction of a bureaucratic system of tax collection only occurred in
Romania as a whole after the eighteenth century. Even though “the system of
collection remained ineffective, the revenues would be collected anyway by
individual bureaucrats, who used the power of their office to extort the bribes
that would keep them in a style regarded as commensurate with their social
status” (Janos 1989: 341).
Essentially, the success of early bureaucratization in Transylvania was that it
provided the authorities with a way to monitor tax payments. Much more
advanced records of property and life events were not only possible because of
themanner in which the administration worked, but also its own institutional
survival over time. Ottomans did not intervene in Romanian territories’
domestic administrative affairs; this meant that they neither created (in the
Romanian Principalities), nor destroyed (in Transylvania) the existing records.
This meant that over the centuries ownership of private and public property
became traceable.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has illustrated in the case of Romania the importance of the
mechanisms through which fiscal collection is exerted. The extent of their
legitimacy and authority is sourced in important elements such as the (un)
coupling of collection and redistribution functions, whether the collection of
Table 10.3. Comparative fiscal duties in the sixteenth century
State Duties owed in gold
coins per capita
Duties owed in kg of
wheat per capita
Poland (1580) 0.14 10
Egypt (1596) 0.15 –
England (1600) 0.25 21.5
India (1600) 0.34 86
Transylvania (1590) 0.4 40
Ottoman Empire (1581–3) 0.5 60
Moldavia (1590) 1 67
Venice (1600) 2 50
Wallachia (1590) 2 134
Low Countries (1650) 4.5 148
Source: Murgescu 1996: 286–8.
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taxes is done for the benefit of domestic or foreign entities and who is
responsible for collection.
As this volume sets out to show, political culture and political institutions
matter greatly in the taxpaying process. In the case of a functioning, trust-
worthy state, the leap of faith means that personal resources would be
invested for the common interest; taxpayers at least believe it to be so.
Throughout most of Romania’s history, the leap of faith merely meant sur-
rendering willingly personal resources. Without the administrative capacity
to systematically monitor and enforce, let alone redistribute, paying taxes in
this case study generally meant taking personal responsibility within your
social group.
According to existing theories, fiscal compliance occurs when citizens
believe: (1) that they will get something in return, and (2) that they will be
punished if they do not comply. The case study of Romania illustrates what
happens if these two conditions fail to coincide. Rulers paid because they
acted under a contractual logic: they maintained their privileges and rights
(i.e. they got something in return) as long as they paid, and they expected to
be punished if they did not comply. In contrast, citizens were subjected to a
much more discretionary collection mechanism with limited monitoring
capacity. They paid their tax when they could not escape it, being pressured
by recognizable figures of authority. Importantly, both the enforcement and
redistribution functions were done through informal intermediaries, such as
local noblemen or Church representatives.
I use this case study to argue that there is more to paying taxes than a simple
logic of returns. As Marcelo Bergman points out: “tax evasion has cultural roots
in social norms and institutional arrangements” (2009: 2). In the Romanian
case study, neither social norms nor institutional arrangements worked in
favor of systematically acquiring the taxpayer’s consent in the fiscal collection
process. There was a process of collection, but without consent. Within the
context of the semi-periphery, where little beyond declarative support came
from the Ottomans, paying their taxes was not a priority for the impoverished
population. In contrast, social norms as well as institutional arrangements did
apply some pressure in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries to the urban
areas of Transylvania, where a nascent bureaucratic system provided benefits of
predictability and rule enforcement for tradesmen and guild workers.
One of the key insights of this chapter is the historical role of localism. This
is in contrast to themainstream understanding of the process of state-building
as a process of consolidation of formal administrative structures. Looking
at the historical experience of Romanians with fiscal authorities, we see a
fluency of rules and institutional actors. But, beyond these shifting structures,
there is a constancy in the normative power in local communities, or small
elite groups. Compliance in Romanian territories is a product of common
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agreement, much like in more developed states, the difference being that
the mechanisms of deliberation and benefit distribution remain hidden as
informal channels.
The second departure of this chapter from mainstream Romanian studies
literature was to treat all Romanian territories within the same comparative
framework. Because of contextual (i.e. foreign influence) and institutional
differences (i.e. administrative practices) scholars tend to analyze them separ-
ately. Romanian territories present themselves as a sort of natural experiment,
with different administrative and fiscal systems during pre-modern times.
A variation we can observe is that the predictability of the bureaucratic
administrative system in Transylvania does seem to have created a certain
civility in citizens’ interactions with the state. In contrast, Romanian Princi-
palities have gone through a consolidation of patrimonial practices and
opportunistic self-interest maximization. As various studies on fiscal compli-
ance suggest, the extent to which Romanians perceive the collection process
to be beneficial to them makes a difference. For a state to be able to create this
perception, it must be able to respond to the wants and needs of the tax-
paying population.
There are several avenues through which the present analysis can be
strengthened or expanded. On the one hand, as this volume proves, there is
much to be learned from comparative historical analysis. While the Romanian
case study bears great similarities with Italy, it differs significantly from
Sweden or England. Both single cases and comparative studies that investigate
further the long-term effects of the coupling of regulations with practices
would be informative. On the other hand, Romania shares many contempor-
ary behavioral patterns with other periphery countries, thus a wider historical
comparative analysis on informal mechanisms of distribution and enforce-
ment in developing countries could be revealing.25
Notes
1. [A fost un ra ̆stimp în care de mirare este cum n-a ajuns acest popor la stingere totala ̆.
Sta ̆teau asupra lui stolurile pra ̆dalnice ale birarilor s ̦i da ̆bilarilor.]
2. Based on the author’s interviews with public affairs specialist, Adelina Țânta̦riu, and
on the analysis of fiscal collection data series at www.dpfbl.mdrap.ro/analize_
bugete.html.
3. See “Willing to Pay?” dataset, http://willingtopay.eu/; and the World Values Survey
datasets, www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
4. I refer to Bogdan Murgescu’s modified measure of urbanization, to include smaller
towns (i.e. over 2,000 inhabitants) and not only larger agglomerations (i.e. those of
over 5,000 or 10,000 inhabitants) (Van Zanden 2005).
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5. While the regulation of their status varied over time, especially in terms of duties
owed and the ruler appointment system, they can be characterized as a quasi-
colony, as they were a conventional part of the Ottoman Empire.
6. In the aftermath of the Crimean War (involving foreign powers that were heavily
influencing the Romanian state at that time—the Russians and the Ottomans),
Romanians found an innovative way to unite the territories of Moldavia and
Wallachia by electing the same leader, Alexandru Ioan Cuza, at the same time in
both Principalities, thus creating from a political perspective the modern state of
Romania.
7. Pravalniceasca Condica ̆ by Alexandru Ipsilanti, 1780, Wallachia; Legiurea Caragea,
1818, Wallachia; Callimachi Code, 1817, Moldavia.
8. 1831 in Wallachia, and 1832 in Moldavia.
9. Regulamentul Organic: Partea Politica ̆ s ̦i Administrativa ̆ [Organic Statute: Political and
Administrative Section], 99. www.digibuc.ro.
10. www.digibuc.ro.
11. Proclamat ̦ia de la Pades ̦ by Tudor Vladimirescu, 1821; Proclamat ̦ia de la Islaz by the
Revolutionary Government, 1848.
12. Tax exemptions were made for those engaged in military service or those who
could not afford to pay (e.g. women, children, serfs).
13. Ruling decisions of Constantin Brâncoveanu from Sâmbăta de Sus Monastery.
14. Denominated Phanar Lords—derived from Phanar, which was the name of the area
in Istanbul where the Constantinople Patriachate resided, along with a concentra-
tion of the Greek population from the capital.
15. Condica vistieriei Ța ̆rii Românes ̦ti din periaoda lui Constantin Brâncoveanu.
16. Based on Bogdan Murgescu’s historical analysis (Murgescu 2012: 119).
17. Numerous contemporary fictional accounts portray this shifting dynamic of power
in favor of these foreign rulers.
18. Calculations made by Dragos ̦Ungureanu from the National Patrimony Institute.
19. Certa puncta (1769) reproduced by Augustin Bunea, Episcopii Petru Pavel Aron si̦
Dionisiu Novacovici, sau istoria românilor transilvăneni de la 1751 pâna ̆ la 1764,
Blaj, 1902, pp. 404–12, in Murgescu (2001: 118).
20. Certa Puncta (1769) (Rules on the reports between noblemen and peasantry in
Transylvania).
21. Ruling decisions of Constantin Brâncoveanu from Sâmbăta de Sus Monastery.
22. Hungarian rule spans 1866 to 1918, but this section also looks at the period when
the Austrian Empire exerted authority over Transylvania (including Banat and
Bukovina provinces). Transylvania became Romanian territory in 1918, at the
Great Unification (Marea Unire).
23. A seventeenth-century bridge in Oradea was under the guarantee of the Austrian
constructor until recently.
24. He was a wealthy nobleman himself, holding high offices (e.g. Ban of Craiova, a
position similar to that of a treasurer), and possessed a vast personal fortune, acquired
especially through land purchases (Murgescu 2012: 45; see also P. P. Panaitescu 2002).
25. I am grateful for the key insights provided by Cornel Ban, Dan Brett, Bogdan
Murgescu, Marina Nistotskaya, Viorel Panaite, Andreas Stamate, and Vladimir
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Topan. I am also indebted to the various experts interviewed for this chapter from
the National Agency for Fiscal Administration (ANAF), the Romanian Orthodox
Church (BOR), and the National Bank of Romania (BNR). This chapter benefited
from the generous advice and close guidance of Sven Steinmo. All limitations and
faults belong to the author.
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Willing to Pay? The Politics of
Engendering Faith in the Post-Communist
Romanian Tax System
Arpad Todor
Despite the fact that Romania has constantly had one of the worst performing
tax systems, with the highest levels of tax evasion among EU countries, a
recent experimental study on tax compliance found that Romanian subjects
are significantly less likely to cheat than Italian and UK subjects in similar
experiments.1 This high tax morale2 is furthermore backed by opinion poll
data showing that Romanians tend to believe tax avoidance is not excusable.
To explain the puzzling gap between the willingness to pay and the constant
underperformance of the tax system, I investigate the process of the post-
Communist creation of a new extensive and comprehensive tax system and its
failure to motivate its subjects to pay their taxes. As the most recent democ-
racy, with the newest tax system, least influenced by path dependencies, the
Romanian case allows us to investigate easily the explanatory power of various
competing theories of tax compliance looking at the weight of competing
causal factors within the same condensed time frame. This case study further-
more allows us to gain an insight into how to improve tax compliance in
developing countries in the contemporary world.
I argue that the structure of incentives created both for those paying mainly
personal income taxes (PIT) and for firms paying corporate income taxes (CIT)
makes it rational to avoid paying them. The high instability and low quality of
the legal framework in combination with the absence of political debate on
fiscal issues; the high level of taxation combined with widespread tax evasion,
high tolerance for state budget debt and generous tax breaks for large firms;
and low spending on infrastructure and other public services, have signaled
constantly that the tax system is not governed by any significant mechanisms
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/6/2018, SPi
generating reciprocity and laying down the base for a fair fiscal contract.
Furthermore, dismal social expenditure (except in pensions, an area with a
broken connection between contribution and benefits) creates the impression
that average citizens do not receive much from the state in exchange for
paying their taxes. Overall, given the constant failure to create an adequate
legitimacy for the tax system, the capacity to directly tax citizens and com-
panies has slowly decreased in recent years, in parallel with an increasing
reliance on indirect taxes.
To substantiate my argument I analyze historical evolutions and examine
the current trends. First, I elaborate the puzzle motivating this investigation
and briefly present the main theoretical approaches on tax compliance that
inform my inquiry. Second, I discuss several features of the Communist tax
systems and the influence of those features on the initial choices and subse-
quent developments of the new tax system. Third, I analyze the most import-
ant characteristics of the post-Communist Romanian tax system that shaped
its capacity to generate tax revenues. Fourth, I evaluate some characteristics of
the structure of state expenditure, focusing on the absence of significant
welfare policies and the consequences for inequality. To conclude, I discuss
the implications of my analysis on the volume’s aim to untangle the mech-
anism through which states have developed comprehensive tax systems and
motivated their citizens to comply with their tax obligations.
The Puzzle
By all metrics, Romania has experienced significant changes in the last quarter
of a century since the fall of the Communist regime, transitioning to a market
economy and achieving measurable improvements in many areas of institu-
tional quality, and quality of the political process. All these evolutions allowed
it to join the European Union in 2007 and experience high rates of economic
growth after the first decade of transition. Yet Romania is a constant laggard in
the area of taxation compared to other post-Communist countries that joined
the EU. Today, Romania still has the lowest tax revenue as a percentage of
GDP in the EU,3 the highest levels of tax evasion, and one of the worst
performing tax collection systems (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2014).
Nevertheless, a recent experimental study on the willingness of subjects to
comply with their tax obligations under various incentive structures found
that, on average, Romanian subjects were highly cooperative and less likely to
cheat than participants in Italy and the UK. The results from the nine Roma-
nian experimental rounds4 showed a compliance rate ranging from 70 percent
to 82 percent, rates that are significantly above the Italian average, and espe-
cially above the results from the three locations in the UK (Oxford, London,
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and Exeter). Although the lowest compliance rate (70 percent) was obtained in
round six of the nine, where a 50 percent income tax was applied, this was still
20 percent above the Italian (51 percent) and the British (48 percent) rates.
This gap is all the more intriguing since, unlike Italy and the UK, which have
steep progressive tax systems, Romania has had a flat personal income tax
since 2004 of 16 percent; thus, the 50 percent tax rate should have appeared
extremely high for Romanian participants.
The relevance of the subjects’ high compliance rate for the entire Romanian
population is strongly backed by other experimental studies and opinion poll
data. For example, in a study of full-time students from four countries
(Romania, Austria, Russia, and Hungary),5 participants from Romania and
Russia tended to identify low-trust scenarios as being more representative of
the situation in their countries (Kogler et al. 2013: 172). When faced with a
similar incentive structure, the students did not differ that much in their
responses; however, differences were apparent when they were confronted
with a scenario similar to that from their own country (Kogler et al. 2013: 176).
Opinion polls tend to tell the same story. For example, in the 2005 Rural
Eurobarometer (Fundati̦a pentru o Societate Deschisă 2005), 83.2 percent of
respondents considered that paying taxes is very important. Also, the October
2007 Barometer of Public Opinion (Fundati̦a pentru o Societate Deschisă
2007), a country-level representative sample, revealed that 70 percent of
the respondents believed that not paying their taxes, assuming that they
could avoid them, is never justified, while only 10 percent considered
that it is justified always or most of the time.6 Furthermore, a 2008 opinion
poll (Fundati̦a pentru o Societate Deschisă 2008) showed that 80 percent
of respondents believed that it is unacceptable for corporations not to
declare revenue, while only 3 percent considered this partly or completely
acceptable.7
These findings contrast with the observation that the Romanian tax system
has the poorest performance among EU countries in terms of the tax gap and
difficulty of paying taxes. In other words, although Romanians do not trust
their country’s institutions, living in a society with high levels of corruption
and an inefficient tax system, they do believe that taxes should be paid and are
willing to pay when presented with an ideal tax system.
The literature on the relationship between tax compliance, institutional
quality, and trust can be divided into three main groups, based on their
core mechanisms of generating compliance: state capacity, deterrence, and
cultural–behavioral-based approaches. In her influential account, following
Schumpeterian tradition, Levi (1989: 1) argues that “[the] history of state
revenue production is the history of the evolution of the state.” Her theory
of the tax state is built around the notion of “quasi-voluntary compliance”
(1989: 52–3), compliance dependent on the population’s perception of the
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number of non-cooperators. Centered on the state, but focusing on the
relationship between taxation policies in the light of political structures that
have shaped various political conflicts, Steinmo has developed an approach to
understanding the differences between diverse tax systems. While multiple
checks and balances in the US led to a fragmented tax system, the Swedish
corporatist model led to a unitary, stable, and efficient tax system. British
politics, on the other hand, dominated by strong parties, has led to an unstable
tax system (Steinmo 1996). Steinmo argues that tax compliance can be seen as
a “fiscal exchange” that manifests a positive correlation between the chance
of winning from the common pot and citizens’ willingness to pay. In a similar
analysis, focused on the post-Communist space, Easter (2002) has compared
Russia and Poland in order to explain how various political constraints led
to the structuring of the tax system. While in Russia the tax extraction system
was the result of elite bargaining over taxing corporate profits, in Poland the
extraction strategy is centered on taxing household incomes.
Parallel to the state-centered literature, starting with Allingham and Sadmo’s
theory of tax compliance based on taxpayers as utility maximizers, various
authors have analyzed deterrence mechanisms as a function of the chances of
being detected, the size of fines, and the potential gains from tax avoidance.
Most theoretical models based on deterrence imply that increasing fines and
control intensity would lead to lower tax evasion and add elements such as the
amount of information available to tax authorities, the formulation of penalties
and responsibilities, audit probability, and non-compliance penalties (Luttmer
and Singhal 2014). Building on this literature, a new generation of models
focuses on the subjective nature of each individual’s assessment of the prob-
ability of being detected. While these theoretical models can be useful to
understand some features of citizen–tax authority interaction, their explanatory
power is rather low given that most tax systems in the world are not based
on deterrence, and do not offer much guidance for tax authorities in their
efforts to improve compliance (Luttmer and Singhal 2014).
The third strand of literature has developed around the concept of tax
morale as an implicit psychological contract between the state and its citizens,
where loyalty is very important while rewards and punishment can crowd
out intrinsic motivations (Frey 1997; Frey and Feld 2002). For example,
Kirchler (1999) discusses tax compliance as a social exchange between the
state and citizens, while Porcano (1988) and Alm, McClelland, and Schulze
(1992) emphasize that tax compliance could be improved if government
accentuated tax compliance as a fiscal exchange. A different type of approach
to tax compliance is developed by Bergman (2009), who argues that the level
of tax compliance is a function of the “compliance equilibria” reached in
different counties, equilibria that are highly dependent on deeply rooted
social norms. Instead, other studies have employed games centered on the
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public good to analyze what kind of variables influence tax evasion levels (Feld
and Tyran 2002; Frey and Feld 2002; Scholz and Lubell 1988).
Focusing specifically on the Romanian case, Bădescu (2007), Rothstein
(2004; 2005), and Uslaner and Bădescu (2004) advance different explanations
for the link between generalized trust, people’s incentive to pay taxes and the
quality of governance. Rothstein (2004) writes that even in a low-trust society
like Romania, the establishment of universal and impartial institutions that
implement public policies aimed at reducing economic inequalities generates
social capital of the type necessary to support economic development. Instead,
Uslaner and Bădescu (2004: 35) argue that “When corruption is rampant, as in
Romania, people become inured to it. They don’t think worse of their fellow
citizens, who must get by in any way they can in a system that seems rigged
toward those at the top. People are disturbed by corruption in government,
but they may feel powerless to do much about it.” Thus, Uslaner and Bădescu
stress that the causal link moves from economic equality to social trust. Also,
while generalized trust does not lead to higher levels of personal tax compli-
ance, it influences people’s propensity to accept higher levels of PIT (Bădescu
2007: 319). Bădescu argues that trust, perception of state capacity, and tax
compliance are linked through three causal mechanisms: (1) if there is a
generalized perception that most people avoid paying taxes, it is rational to
try the same strategy; (2) perceiving that the mechanism for spending taxes is
inefficient and rigged by corruption stimulates noncompliance; (3) those who
believe that poverty is caused by a lack of work and individual merit would be
more prone to avoiding paying taxes (Bădescu 2007: 308).
All in all, the explanatorymodels advanced by different theoretical accounts
of compliance focus on the same core variables, but give them different
weights and put different emphases on the causal links among them. To
understand what kind of theoretical model can offer more insight into the
causes that lead to the puzzling data that motivates this inquiry, in the
following sections I will investigate how the state, and the tax system in
particular, relates to citizens. The historical narrative starts with the Commun-
ist period, when most developments that influenced the post-Communist
period occurred.
Path Dependencies
Starting with August 23, 1944, when Romania switched sides in World War II
and turned against Nazi Germany, the USSR’s influence on Romania quickly
increased and led to the installation of the Petru Groza cabinet in March 1945
and the fraudulent 1946 elections, culminating in the forced abdication of
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the last monarch and the proclamation of the Popular Republic in December
1947. Under close supervision from Soviet advisers whose authority was
enhanced by the presence of Soviet troops (Pop 2006), the economy was
transformed into a socialist one, with the elimination of practically all private
property and the collectivization of agriculture and tax extraction. The new
approach to increasing tax compliance was detailed in Law no. 344 from
December 1947, which introduced harsh penalties against tax evasion but
also the option of paying previously avoided tax in order to escape prison
sentences. For the first time, tax evasion was regarded as equivalent to state
sabotage and was sanctioned by harsh punishments.
While various forms of small private economic activities survived, during
the Communist period most economic actors were state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and the exact level of taxation of their profit was established through
negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and the SOEs. Also, workers
were mainly taxed through hidden payroll deductions, directly retained by
the SOEs; thus employees were not even aware they were being taxed. As the
Communist regime started to transform the economy and eliminate private
economic actors, a new set of regulations was elaborated with Decree no.
202/1953 regarding the modification of the Penal Code. This law introduced
a chapter on offences against the economic system, which defined tax evasion
as sabotage. While this regulation was eliminated from the 1969 Penal Code,
Law no. 18/1968 regarding the control of goods owned by natural persons
who had obtained them illegally introduced the state’s right to evaluate people’s
wealth and to compare it with their existing means of income (Virjan 2012: 7).
According to this law, any unsubstantiated wealth was taxed at a rate of 80
percent.8 Given the substantial size of the shadow economy, especially in the
agricultural sector, the discretionary ability of tax authorities to apply arbi-
trary formulas to evaluate income and expenditure, and the limited means
available to appeal decisions in the courts, this law was occasionally used
as a discretionary tool of repression. While no official data exists on how
widespread the application of this regulation was, the law created such a
climate of insecurity that the 1991 Constitution included a special formula-
tion in Art. 44(8): “Legally acquired assets shall not be confiscated. Legality
of acquisition shall be presumed.”9 Basically, this constitutional provision
limited the possibility of enacting laws that would require the obligation to
prove the source of someone’s wealth, a limitation that was confirmed by a
1996 decision of the Constitutional Court that declared unconstitutional the
still unabolished 1968 law.
Another development, peculiar to Romania’s final decade under Commun-
ist rule, is represented by the self-imposed austerity measures begun in 1982,
following the 1973 oil crisis since which the balance of payments had deteri-
orated and foreign debt increased (Pop 2006: 16). According to Ban (2012),
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Romania embarked upon a harsh austerity program that led to a collapse in
living standards and the explosion of an informal economy. Following the
1982 debt crisis, the combination of Stalinist and nationalist views on devel-
opment policies lead the Ceause̦scu regime to embark on a course of rapidly
paying off all foreign debt and prioritizing industrialization. These policies led
to a significant decrease in consumption, extensive food and other goods
shortages, and led to an exhaustion of the regime’s sources of legitimacy.
Furthermore, to justify the decrease in the availability of goods (Ben-Ner and
Montias 1991), the Communist regime imposed a program of rational nutrition
that set a strict basic food quota for each person. Combined with a chronic
undersupply of official groceries and severe limitations on imported food, all
the conditions for the development of a parallel system of food production
and distribution developed. Thus, a large part of the population was using that
alternative system, a factor that implicitly meant that they participated in
tax evasion activities and were liable to harsh punishments, a situation that
significantly affected their institutional trust in the decades to come. Within
this context, the percentage of goods acquired through the shadow economy
has significantly increased and the process that indirectly affected Romanians’
propensity to pay taxes during the Communist regime has developed as a
coping mechanism for the inefficiency and scarcities of official production
and poor distribution of goods, especially food.
The Communist legacy was responsible for equally deleterious outcomes in
the area of business taxation. Despite their limited development, non-state-
run enterprises have been subject to detailed tax regulation since 1968, when
Decree no. 65 introduced a steep taxation systemwith rates from 10 percent to
45 percent (Rotaru 2009). Subsequently, Romania increased the progressivity
of its taxation policy in this sector, introducing tax rates of up to 77 percent, a
change that generated only insignificant revenues as the state’s interest in
controlling these businesses was limited. Also, given the high integration of
production streams (Pasti 2006: 358) the socialist system had separated the
organization of production from cash flow as trade among firms took place
through planning allocations and not profit- or efficiency-based mechanisms
(Pop 2006: 18). All in all, these legacies would prove to have long-lasting
effects during the transition period from communism to a free market
economy.
The Unfinished Post-Communist Fiscal Contract
Given the significant differences between the logic of a tax system designed
for a centralized as opposed to a market-based economy, the post-Communist
authorities faced significant dilemmas regarding the transition toward a new
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/6/2018, SPi
Arpad Todor
256
tax system. Also, the initial choices were made under conditions of economic
downturn and rapidly decreasing state revenues, as well as limited access to
capital markets (Ban and Tamames 2015). Given that the price system had
been bureaucratically determined, the process of price liberalization inflicted
significant economic pain, with a hugely inefficient and energy-intensive
industry (Pop 2006: 16) in need of significant restructuring. As hard budgetary
constraints started to affect big SOEs, they started to proactively avoid paying
taxes. By the end of 1991, the state abandoned its coordinating functions in
the economy (Pasti 2006: 356) and the effects of price liberalization and firms’
restructuring led to protests and a period of high mobilization by the unions
(Pop 2006: 22). The initial reforms adopted under pressure from the IMF led
to a deleterious recession, contraction of credit, increasing inter-company
arrears, and the collapse of purchasing power (Ban and Tamames 2015: 77).
Furthermore, the absence of an indirect taxation system and a widespread
lack of trust inmost state institutions (with the exception of the army) made it
difficult to rapidly create and implement new fiscal rules and institutions.
Thus, in practice the new government had chosen to enact a CIT system
that borrowed many of the features of the Communist system for taxing
independent activities. The first tax reforms began in early 1991 with the
introduction of a CIT based on a sixty-seven-step scale starting at 5 percent
(for income between 25,001 RON and 50,000 RON) and rising to 77 percent
(for income above 955 million RON), a tax rate among the highest in the
world. Meanwhile, foreign investors were given special status and corpor-
ations with full foreign ownership paid no taxes for the first two years after
they started to earn profit from their investments. Subsequently, the Ministry
of Finance could further offer them a 50 percent cut on their CIT. The mixed
ownership corporations were granted a permanent 50 percent CIT cut. It
is worth mentioning that at that time Romania had basically no Foreign
Direct Investments (FDI)10 and that while these tax facilities did not trigger
any relevant FDI influx, they were used as a means of tax evasion and by
immigrants fromMiddle Eastern countries to open various import–export busi-
nesses. Also, Law no. 82 from1991 (Accounting law) criminalized the entering of
false data in companies’ books, an offence punishable with imprisonment
from six months to five years. Nevertheless, in practice, the chance that small
mistakes would occur was very high, an aspect that generated significant dis-
cretionary power for the tax authorities and high incentives for tax evasion.
Basically, the widespread norm was that all companies were given small fines
and made bribery payments to the tax inspectors.
The initial tax systemwas so poorly designed that by the end of 1991, with a
direct contribution from the World Bank, the progressive taxation of the
CIT was scrapped and a system with just two levels was introduced. This
changed again in 1995 to a unique 38 percent rate.11 The first comprehensive
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regulation concerning tax evasionwas enacted throughGovernment Ordinance
no. 17 of August 1993, defining the contraventions for breach of financial
and fiscal regulation. Subsequently, according to Law 87 from 1994, tax
evasion was defined as any avoidance of paying taxes to any of the state
budgets or funds by natural or legal Romanian or foreign persons (Virjan
2012: 3). The limited success of the tax system in adapting to new economic
conditions is reflected not only in the decrease of tax/GDP revenues from
34 percent to 28 percent by 1995, a percentage that remained constant until
2015, but also a decreased tax effort (Mertens 2003: 548), a situation further
aggravated by various tax exemptions and tax breaks that perpetuated soft
budget constraints until EU accession (Daianu, Kallai, and Lungu 2012: 164).
Two important milestones that switched the approach toward a more coher-
ent and predictable tax system came in 2005 with Law no. 241/2005 and
Cabinet Decree no. 873 of July 28, 2005. They modified the fiscal regulation
with new measures for fighting tax evasion in the areas of alcohol and oil
taxation (Daianu, Kallai, and Lungu 2012: 8). The most important institu-
tional consolidation was enacted in 2004 when the National Agency for
Fiscal Administration (NAFA) unified the previously fragmented fiscal duties.
While the 2014 Report by the Accounting Court shows some noticeable
improvement in the NAFA’s functioning, a systemic improvement of the
tax system is still to be felt. Furthermore, despite the fact that one of themain
aims in creating the NAFA was to reduce the widespread corruption among
tax authorities, by 2016 four of the five former NAFA general directors had
been prosecuted for corruption by the anti-corruption agency.
Even within the context of a region with high tax instability, the Romanian
tax system stands out. The initial choices created a locked-in effect that made
the Romanian tax system one of the worst in the region, a situation further
aggravated by the high level of corruption (Transparency International n.d.).
While the Ministry of Finance constantly attempted to clarify the tax
code system with the aim of increasing the state’s collection capacity, a
lack of adequate foresight led to continuous modifications and very low
predictability of revenue collection. More than a thousand modifications
of the legislation were introduced over a period of twenty-five years, with
countless situations where a new modification of the tax code in parliament
was further modified by a government Emergency Ordinance just days after
it came into force. For example, the 2003 Fiscal Code was modified one
hundred times between 2004 and 2013, the number of words tripled to
190,000, and only twenty-five Articles out of the initial 298 remained
unchanged (Medrega 2013).
It is no wonder that in 2015 the Romanian tax system still exhibited one
of the worst performances: in the Ease of Paying Taxes measure, Romania
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ranked 134th out of the 170 countries evaluated, the worst in the EU
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2014). Despite the implementation of the flat tax
in 2004, its worst ranking was in the number of different taxes to be paid
by businesses annually (including the personal taxes on their employees’
salaries), totaling ninety-six in all. Only recently did Romania achieve some
perceptible progress in the area of compliance cost, according to World
Bank data. Despite the still high number of payments (thirty-nine), the
total time necessary to prepare, file, and pay taxes has decreased to 200
hours and come closer to the EU average of 166 hours, better than Italy at
269 hours.
As in other countries, the complex and dysfunctional Romanian tax system
goes hand in hand with a low enforcement capability. Although taxation
levels reach 43.2 percent, above the EU average of 41 percent (Olescu 2015),
due primarily to high social security contributions (SSC) and value added tax
(VAT) rates, fiscal evasion for 2013 was estimated at 16.2 percent of GDP,
75 percent (12.21 percent of GDP) related to VAT12 and 15 percent stemming
from unpaid social insurance contributions from workers without an employ-
ment contract or paid partially outside a legal contract.13 Overall, Romania
has the worst VAT collection capacity, with only 56 percent of the income
extracted (compared to 83 percent in Estonia or 71 percent in the Czech
Republic), and the lowest social insurance contribution collection capacity,
reaching only 72 percent, among the worst in the EU (Consiliul Fiscal 2014).
A 2015 Report by the Court of Accounts (Bratu 2016; Curtea de Conturi a
Romaniei 2015) reveals a huge imbalance in tax compliance between labor
and capital, showing that businesses accounted for 96.5 percent of arrears,
with the top 2.7 percent of companies responsible for 75.7 percent of the
outstanding amount. The report also underlines a limited interest by NAFA in
cracking offshore tax evasion: firms identified with a high risk of tax evasion
and transfer pricing are multinational corporations, a fact widely reflected in
mass-media reports. Furthermore, the report also identifies significant short-
comings in terms of procedural equity, with multiple cases in which entities
operating under similar conditions receive different treatment. Thus, unlike
the older EU member states, where the distribution of income from direct and
indirect taxes is balanced, tax revenues in Romania are skewed toward indirect
taxes such as VAT and excise duties. For example, revenues from PIT decreased
from 5.3 percent of GDP in 1995 to just 2.7 percent in 2002, and then hovered
around 3.3 percent, while revenues from CIT decreased from 5.3 percent
of GDP to a low of 2.3 percent in 2005, and then recovered to 3.3 percent of
GDP. On the other hand, despite high tax evasion, indirect taxes (VAT and
excise duties) increased their share of total tax revenue from 33.7 percent in
1997 to 45.2 percent by 2010 and have remained constant since, above the
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average of other post-Communist countries (42.3 percent) or the old EU
member states (36.2 percent).14
All in all, despite significant evolution since the fall of the Communist
regime in 1989, Romania still ranks bottom, alongside Bulgaria, in almost
all relevant indicators of institutional capacity to collect revenues. With an
average tax revenue as a percentage of GDP of only 28 percent between 1995
and 2012, Romania is 11 percent under the EU average (Pana 2016b). By
comparison, other post-Communist countries are performing significantly
better in this dimension: Hungary’s tax revenue as a percentage of GDP is
38.6, Slovenia’s 37.6, the Czech Republic’s 35.3, and Poland’s 31.8.
Unlike in consolidated democracies, despite the continuing malfunction
of the tax system, as well as the widespread frustration it causes, tax reforms
have rarely been the subject of intense political debate or confrontation
(Steinmo 1996), regardless of the political coalition in power. The constant
modifications of the tax code legal statute were mostly needed to correct
various mistakes, clarify incoherencies, or close widely used loopholes. Also,
political parties have made no attempt to detail their proposals for tax
reforms in their electoral programs beyond generalities; government pro-
grams have contained just general aims, such as reducing tax evasion and
increasing revenue targets, and have not detailed how to achieve these
goals. It is no wonder that Romania was one of the countries where the
neoliberal flat tax reform was put on the political agenda by the Ministry of
Finance of the Social Democratic Party and gained the support of the prime
minister. However, the party abandoned the reform due to opposition
pressure from the Romanian president (who was also the ex-leader of the
Social Democratic Party). Subsequently, the flat tax was proposed by the
right-wing Truth and Justice Alliance as a major electoral theme and was
later implemented through a government Emergency Ordinance, without
any debate in parliament. The 2015 adoption of the new tax code offers
another example of the lack of political debates around fiscal issues. The
new law has been adopted twice in parliament through general political
consensus, after the president sent it back with objections regarding the
reliability of the revenue streams, given the planned tax cuts (especially the
decrease of VAT from 24 percent to 19 percent). Despite the presence of
parliamentary scrutiny (see Daunton, Chapter 6 in this volume), unlike
Italy, Sweden, the UK or the US, where tax reforms involve significant
debates and negotiations with a large number of societal actors (unions,
business associations, the Church, think-tanks), Romania continues its his-
torical trend of no political debates around taxation and its link with
expenditure, especially the welfare state. In the following section I will
discuss the link between the fiscal issue and the post-Communist develop-
ment of the welfare state.
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The Welfare State and Inequality
Although during the first decade of post-Communism transition Romania’s
economic policies were highly inconsistent, especially with the constant
friction between internal actors and interest groups aligned with external
institutions (Ban 2013; Pasti 2006), after the start of the EU-accession negoti-
ations the Romanian development model became coherent and remained
fairly stable under alternate governing coalitions. The move from uncoordin-
ated capitalism (cocktail capitalism) toward a “dependent market economy”
relied on multinational banks, FDI, and proactive policies to promote liberal-
ization and the privatization of public utility companies. The move has
also influenced the tax system and the functioning of the welfare system
(Ban 2013). While this development model was associated with higher than
average rates of economic growth (Ban 2013: 7), it also increased the shift of
the tax burden toward labor and consumption and increased inequality. The
post-2007 economic crisis further exacerbated this shift, as costs of the eco-
nomic crisis have been transferred away from capital, a change reflected by the
fact that the national net income received by wage earners decreased from 48
percent to just 40 percent by 2013, while the average is 65 percent in the US
and 60 percent in France (Georgescu 2015).
A direct effect of its low budgetary revenues is the fact that Romania also has
one of the lowest rates of public investment and the worst infrastructure in
the EU. Furthermore, the efficiency of those expenditures is rather low given
the high levels of corruption, especially in public procurement (Consiliul
Fiscal 2014: 16). Even though Romania became a member of the European
Union in 2007, its socio-economic development lags behind the EU average
in almost all areas with no indication that it is catching up. Like some other
post-Communist countries, Romania is facing demographic pressures, espe-
cially a declining population, high emigration, and a pensioners-to-employees
ratio that is worse than in many developed EU member countries and is
forecast to dramatically worsen in future decades (Expert Forum 2012).
Like many other Communist countries, Romania started with a low level of
economic inequality. During the transition to post-Communism, the Gini
coefficient steadily increased, given both the move to capitalism and the
limited effect of transfer policies. According to World Bank data, the Gini
coefficient increased from 23.3 in 1989 to 31.8 in 1998, ranging between
29.5 and 30.46 by 2006, and increased above 35 in 2008.15 An analysis of
the impact of flat-tax reform on inequality reveals that, as expected, most of
the gains from the PIT flattening went to the top 20 percent of income earners,
stimulated consumption only within this group, and led to a perceptible
increase in overall income inequality in Romania (Voinea and Mihaescu
2009). Thus, while EU accession led to a decrease in inequality, post-2008
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financial crisis economic growth was unequally distributed and led to an
increase in the Gini coefficient from 33.4 in 2010 to 34.7 in 2014 (Pana
2016a). It is worth mentioning that the Romanian state’s social policies have
been totally ineffective in limiting this increasing inequality. On the other
hand, the massive emigration of three million people (15 percent of the total
population) after EU accession (emigration that significantly increased remit-
tances, especially in rural regions), had a positive effect on revenues in many
of Romania’s poorest regions. Nevertheless, despite this huge emigration,
Romania continues to rank the worst of all EU countries in terms of inequal-
ity and risk of poverty.16
As Romania has the lowest tax revenue and GDP in the EU, social protection
and education expenditure rank last in the EU. Nevertheless, the total cost of
pensions is in third place as part of total public expenditure (Pana 2016b).
Overall, “data from Eurostat reflects an increase of spending on social protec-
tion benefits from 378.7 Euro/inhabitant in 2002 to 916.57 Euro/inhabitant
in 2009 but despite the 2.4 times increase, it is still very far from the 7823.13
Euro/inhabitant, the average spending in the EU-15 (the old EU member
states)” (Todor 2015: 81). One of the most important reasons or incentives
for citizens to trust the state with their money is that they receive in return
good public services or support for social cohesion through an adequate
redistribution. Despite the fact that social services expenditure as a percent-
age of total expenditure has reached a high level in Romania, the area
that consumes most resources is the pension system, while the amount
of resources spent on other categories such as family and child benefits,
or sickness and disability benefits is dismal.17 This situation was partially
caused by the rapid increase in unemployment during the harsh economic
adjustments of the 1990s, combined with the mass pension programs
designed to alleviate unemployment. Also, through the implementation of
special pension programs for those who have worked in the military, police,
justice, or secret services, the link between social contributions and the level
of pensions became highly distorted, significantly decreasing taxpayers’
incentive to report real wages. For example, the special pension system offers
an average pension that is three times higher than the regular pension and
generates ongoing public outrage.
In May 2010, “Romania enacted one of the most aggressive and regressive
fiscal retrenchment programs” (Todor 2014: 39), justified by budgetary pres-
sures triggered by the post-2007 economic crisis. Most importantly, Prime
Minister Boc’s Cabinet committed itself to the goal of cutting social security
costs from 2.9 percent of GDP to 2 percent (the EU average is 5 percent), as
mentioned in the Social Assistance Reform Strategy.18 Although these plans
were never put into practice because of the results of subsequent elections, it
is worth stressing that debates on the future of the welfare state or the link
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between taxation and the welfare state were hardly relevant during the 2012
electoral battle. Blyth argues that the REBLL (the Baltic states, Bulgaria, and
Romania) group’s approach to austerity during the economic crisis under the
supervision of the troika (the International Monetary Fund, the European
Central Bank, and the European Commission) is unique, given that it was
caused by their growth model based on foreign borrowing, high FDI inflows,
and dependence on remittances—a model highly vulnerable to external
shocks. The austerity measures contained mostly expenditure cuts and only
regressive tax increases such as VAT and labor taxes, which led to a significant
increase in the levels of tax evasion (Blyth 2013: 129). Even worse, today
Romania has one of the highest percentages of working poor, as Eurostat
data indicates (14.2 percent compared with the EU average of 5.5 percent or
the newmember states average of 7.1 percent), a situation that disproportion-
ately affects young cohorts and is explained by the lack of indexing of most
personal deductions within the context of PIT flattening (Pana 2015).
All in all, the limited Romanian welfare state is neither truly functional nor
based on very clear and predictable rules. Given the country’s low taxation
capacity, welfare consumes a high proportion of the state budget and is
constantly used as a scapegoat for the significant underinvestment in infra-
structure or areas such as education. In addition, because the current popula-
tion decrease will further shrink the future benefits of regular employees, the
system is perceived as highly unfair.
Conclusions
This chapter set out to investigate the process of creation of a new post-
Communist Romanian tax system, the main characteristics of the efforts to
create its rules and institutions, and how these evolutions affected the rela-
tionship of citizens with the tax system. The investigation started from the
puzzling observation that Romania appears to exhibit two extremes: on
the one hand, it has developed the worst tax system in the EU in terms
of the quality of its functionality, the tax gap, and its general instability, and
on the other hand Romanians appear to have high tax morale and are willing
to pay when faced with ideal tax institutions.
To explain this puzzle, I have reviewed the main theoretical approaches on
tax compliance and investigated the historical processes that have led to the
current situation of the tax system. This investigation allowed me to explain
what constellation of various explanatory variables accounts for the gap
between observed and manifested tax compliance. Far from being simple,
the observed gap is caused by a complex set of factors, most of them related
to low institutional quality. Romania’s tax system is neither stable nor
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efficient, but is burdensome, inefficient, and undermines its own legitimacy as
it allows people in powerful and influential positions to easily avoid paying
taxes. Romanians do not live, yet, in a well-functioning society and do not,
rationally, trust government-run institutions to any degree. Despite the fact
that most Romanians do not consider that they receive adequate services and
welfare protection for their taxes, they appear to be willing to pay, believe that
everyone should pay, and see the fight against corruption as the main aim in
trying to improve the current situation. The historical analysis showed that
some constants of the structure of incentives created for both those paying
mainly PIT and firms paying CIT made it rational to avoid paying taxes. Not
only has the legal framework regulating taxation been highly unstable and
unpredictable throughout the entire post-Communist period, but these hun-
dreds of smaller or bigger adjustments have not been the subject of significant
political debate and negotiation among relevant social actors. The combin-
ation of high numbers of taxes, high levels of taxation, significant tax evasion,
and corruption, which have led to low spending on infrastructure, public
services, and social expenditure, limits the chances of creating an adequate
legitimacy for the tax system and the underlying social contract supporting it
(see also Volintiru, Chapter 10 in this volume, on the long-term explanations
for this situation). All this has led to an increased resistance to direct taxation
and increasing reliance on regressive indirect taxes. Nevertheless, it is worth
stressing that data reveals that tax avoidance is not widespread in terms of the
percentage of the population that participates in paying it. In fact, data reveals
that most tax avoidance (CIT and VAT) happens in the corporate sector.
Thus, unlike Italy where tax avoidance can be explained along a North–
South divide (see D’Attoma, Chapter 5 in this volume) or religious differences
(see Hien, Chapter 4 in this volume), these dimensions appear to be irrelevant in
Romania. Also, while Volintiru’s analysis reveals that the historical legacy signifi-
cantly differs from successful countries such as Sweden (see Nistotskaya and
D’Arcy, Chapter 2 in this volume) or the UK (see Daunton, Chapter 6 in this
volume), this chapter shows that almost all relevant causality can be traced to
post-Communist Romanian history.
The divergent combination of high tax morale and widespread tax evasion
implies that ameliorating tax compliance cannot be undertaken significantly
through deterrence mechanisms since strong punishment in less than perfect
institutional settings easily transforms into discretionary power that encour-
ages corruption. Both in the Communist and post-Communist period, legal
provisions offered tax authorities significant leverage in order to impose harsh
punishment on those that evaded taxes. Nevertheless, no data indicates that
these mechanisms have been efficient, as the results actually prove the contrary.
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This analysis shows that even in the presence of significant tax free-riders,
quasi-compliance does not necessarily crowd out compliance if the instru-
ments used to tax different parts of the population differ significantly. Also,
the quasi-compliance explanation does not take into consideration the fact
that people might crave a change in the quality of institutional operation.
These findings also argue against trust-based explanations. By analyzing vari-
ous opinion polls collected throughout the last two decades, Bădescu (2007)
concludes that for the average Romanian, the most important ability of the
state is to fight corruption—that is, fight with direct results on limiting the big
tax evaders. Another finding reported by Bădescu (2007) using a 2004 survey is
that most Romanians favor limited state taxes as a percentage of GDP, espe-
cially given the high level of perceived corruption. Bădescu (2007: 312) writes
that opinion poll data reveals that many Romanians cannot correctly evaluate
the link between the structure of taxation and its impact on inequality. Data
consistently shows that Romanians do not have faith in tax authorities in
particular and state institutions in general to spend their taxes wisely. Never-
theless, the historical analysis shows that rationally speaking, Romanians do
not have many reasons to trust the state in how it fairly collects and spends
their taxes, and they are right in their evaluation that those with money are
less likely to pay their share of taxes.While Romania is both a low-trust society
with comparatively low institutional quality, identifying public policy solu-
tions to exit such social traps (Rothstein 2005) requires an in-depth under-
standing of causal links among relevant variables, as well as how they can be
altered through various government policies. Before anything else, inadequate
trust of poorly functioning and corrupt institutions eliminates any relevant
triggers and incentives for improvement.
These findings strongly support the conclusion that Romanians might
exhibit highly cooperative behavior under ideal institutions, but they experi-
ence low tax morale given their perceptions of existing tax institutions and
how they operate—these are not contradictory positions. Yes, Romanians are
willing to pay if they face transparent and fully functional institutions, but
when they recognize a low-trust, low-compliance scenario they defect (Frey
and Torgler 2007: 136; Kogler et al. 2013: 176). This brief review of some of the
most important historical evolutions shows that based on historical events,
rational citizens shouldmanifest a low level of tax compliance given that taxes
have been usually used inefficiently. Accordingly, reforms that would increase
the fairness of taxation, especially the fight against high-level corruption,
directly linked with high-level tax evasion, could generate a virtuous circle
that could change the way people relate to institutions, even in the absence of
an increased level of interpersonal trust.19
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Notes
1. Research conducted within the “Willing to Pay? Testing Institutionalist Theory
with Experiments” ERC Grant agreement no. 295675, coordinated by Prof. Sven
Steinmo. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Alexandra Diaconescu, Dinu
Gutu̦, Andrada Nimu, Daniela Panica, Sebastian Țoc, and Andrei Vlăducu in organ-
izing the experiments in Bucharest at the National School for Political Science and
Public Administration.
2. Tax morale is defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes in Torgler (2003).
3. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP decreased from34 percent in 1992 to 28 percent
in 1997 and remained constant until 2015. Daianu, Kallai, and Lungu (2012: 164).
Eurostat website (2017) Table: Total tax revenue by country, 1995–2016 (%ofGDP).
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:
Total_tax_revenue_by_country,_1995-2016_(%25_of_GDP).png.
4. The experiments were organized in nine rounds in Bucharest in May 2014 and
involved a total of 135 subjects. Participants were selected randomly from an
electronic database created for the purposes of that experiment. While most people
in the pool were undergraduate students from the National School for Political
Science and Public Administration, around 35 percent were recruited following the
dissemination of posters in downtown Bucharest.
5. The study involved 1,319 students: 95 percent in Economics or Business Adminis-
tration, “from the University of Vienna in Austria, the University of Debrecen in
Hungary, the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, and the National
ResearchUniversity and theAcademyofNational Economy inMoscow,Russia. 329 stu-
dents participated in Austria (57.8% female; mean age 22.0, SD = 3.4), 280 students
in Hungary (68.6% female; mean age 21.1, SD = 2.1), 400 students were recruited in
Romania (62.5% female; mean age = 21.7, SD = 1.4), and 341 students participated
in Russia (52.8% female; mean age = 18.82, SD = 1.9)” (Kogler et al. 2013: 172).
6. On a scale of (1)–(10), where 1 = never justified and 10 = always justified, 53.1%
answered that avoiding taxes is never justified (1), 10% answered (2), and 8.4%
answered (3); while 3% chose (8), 2.2% chose (9), and 7.6% answered (10) = always
justified.
7. On a scale of (1)–(10) where 1 = completely unacceptable and 10 = totally accept-
able, 59.2% answered (1), 13.4% answered (2), and 7.4% answered (3); whereas
0.8% chose (8), 2.6% chose (9), and 2.6% chose (10) = totally acceptable.
8. Article 2 provided: “The value of assets whose origin is not substantiated is subject to an
80 percent tax. Substantiating the origin of assets means the obligation of the person
to prove the licit character of means used for acquiring or increasing the assets.”
See https://cristidanilet.wordpress.com/2011/06/23/opinie-despre-prezumtia-liceitatii-
dobandirii-averii/.
9. www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act2_2&par1=2#t2c2s0sba44: “(8) Averea
dobândită licit nu poate fi confiscată. Caracterul licit al dobândirii se prezumă.”
10. FDI reached $5 per capita in 1992 and $9 per capita in 1993 according to IMF data.
Romania ranked last throughout the entire post-Communist period in terms of FDI
per capita among the ten new post-Communist EU member states.
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11. The nextmajor development came in 2000 when the CIT was cut to 25 percent and
the tax on profits from exports decreased to 5 percent (Sfetcu 2013).
12. The low VAT collection capacity is a constant of the entire post-Communist period.
Romania ranked bottom in its capacity to collect VAT, and by 2014 the VAT
evasion rate reached 44 percent.
13. Estimated at 1.57 million people—27.7 percent of the total active labor force
(Consiliul Fiscal 2014: 18).
14. Eurostat (2015): Indirect Taxes as % of Total Taxation—Total.
15. See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=RO.
16. Eurostat data indicate that around 22.5 percent of the population is still at risk
of poverty after social transfers. See Table 1: “At-risk-of-poverty rate after social
transfers, 2011–13” at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/
Income_distribution_statistics#Database.
17. Although pensions are labeled as social expenditures in Romania, the general
perception of the pension is that it is a right earned by paying social contributions
during the years when a person is active in the labor market. A 2010 decision by the
Romanian Constitutional Court declared pensions a patrimonial right, and impli-
citly excluded them from the sphere of social expenditures (www.ccr.ro/files/prod
ucts/D0871_10.pdf).
18. Strategia privind reforma în domeniul asistente̦i sociale 2011–13 [National
Strategy for reform in social services]: www.mmuncii.ro/pub/img/site/files/
58bd6ffc9844fbc4a8a639672450872b.pdf.
19. I am grateful to Cornel Ban and Bo Rothstein for their insightful comments on
the initial draft of this chapter, and to Alexandru Mustată̦, who helped me with the
editing of the text.
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So What?
We conclude this volume with a simple and blunt question: So what?1 Per-
haps the historical narratives in this book are fun to read and interesting for
historians, but do they matter? In other words, do these “stories” have any-
thing to teach us beyond the narratives themselves? This concluding chapter
is devoted to answering this question. We argue that the analyses offered here
are more than simply interesting stories about different countries and instead
offer insights into how and why some countries have been better able to build
positive relationships between citizens and their states than others. Though
the substantive focus here has been on taxes and tax compliance, we further
believe that these lessons have significant implications that go far beyond the
study of fiscal policy.
Specifically, these analyses teach us important lessons about both citizens
and states. Many models of development are built on classical economic
theory that assumes an essentially hostile relationship between citizens and
their states in which citizens and taxpayers are mostly driven by short-term
self-interest and their desire to pay as little as possible. The analyses contained
in this book demonstrate that this is not the right way to think about this
relationship. It is clear that citizens can be intimidated into paying taxes. In
societies that are more successful in collecting taxes, however, citizens and
taxpayers willingly take a “leap of faith” and pay their taxes because of some
sense of public good, common identity, and/or sense of equity. While it is
clearly the case that short-term self-interest plays a role in citizens’willingness
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/6/2018, SPi
to pay, it is equally clear that citizens are also driven by social norms, a desire
for fairness, a sense of belonging, and even their social values.
In recent years there has been a powerful narrative suggesting that markets
are better than states and that a key problem in themodern world is that states
have become too strong. In our view this is wrong. The analyses contained in
this book suggest that the opposite may even be true. We see in several of the
previous chapters that strong states can in fact elicit higher levels of voluntary
compliance. Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010) estimate that the
average of economic activity hidden from tax authorities in the developing
world (where the weakest states are found) is 35.7 percent of GDP, while in
OECD countries where most strong states are located, the hidden economy is
18.7 percent. It may seem counter-intuitive, but it apparently takes a strong
state to deliver the kinds of goods and services that citizens are willing to pay
for. Intimidating citizens into paying taxes can be done, but this is the
behavior of a weak state. Moreover, heavy reliance on intimidation is an
extraordinarily inefficient way of collecting revenue and is likely to generate
very high levels of defection and evasion.
Citizens are more willing to take the “leap of faith” and comply with state
authorities when the state is sufficiently capable of delivering goods and
services that are worth paying for and sufficiently able to reinforce social
norms of compliance. We will discuss the relationship between state capacity
and social norms below, but the main point here is that a positive compliance
equilibrium can be built only where states have high levels of information
about their society and have coherent legal rules that are applied to the whole
of society fairly.
The analyses in the preceding chapters have clearly shown that it is precisely
those states that are strong that have managed to develop a two-way street
with taxpayers and thereby move beyond the predator–victim relationship.
The lessons from the five cases examined in this book allow us to disentangle
the variables that have been shown to work and present a sequence model
or phased paths that may lead to better compliance. It is this type of state
strength that allows a culture of compliance to co-evolve with state capacity.2
This concluding chapter summarizes several aspects of tax compliance
developed throughout this project, highlighting what has worked in tax
compliance and what the lessons are for countries worldwide. Rather than
recapitulating the narratives themselves, we look to use learned lessons to
guide future debates as well as make scholars and practitioners from different
latitudes aware of several topics that are not generally developed in the research.
Thus, in the last section we offer our conclusions as to what we believe needs
to be taken into consideration when countries want to reduce tax evasion
and enhance compliance. We stress that in addition to smart taxes, adequate
tax rates, and strong institutional capacities, governments should be thinking
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how to elicit the “leap of faith” from the population. Only then will tax compli-
ance be sustainable.
The chapter is divided into four major sections. The first highlights the
importance of effective states and the emergence of stable institutions in
compliance behavior. In the second section we draw from the historical
narratives explored in this book and examine the foundation stones for
building fiscal legitimacy. In other words, what kinds of general policy have
successful states followed in contrast to those that have been much less
successful in generating high levels of consent? The third section identifies
the “lessons learned” from our studies and the routes taken to improve
compliance behavior. Finally, we conclude with a series of policy implications
drawn from our comparative narratives, other studies on taxation, as well as
from our behavioral experiment research. Our aim here is to offer insights into
the kinds of policy that seem to have worked in the more successful cases we
have examined and not to make predictions about what exact policies any
specific country should follow.
Strong States and Successful Societies
Margaret Levi’s classic, On Rule and Revenue, characterizes tax compliance as a
relationship between predators and subjects. In this view, governments
extract as much as they can get away with by providing services and/or
through extortion. States will provide only as much as they have to in order
to get the revenues they need and taxpayers will pay only as much as they
have to in order to avoid punishment. This “fiscal exchange” can vary from
country to country, to be sure, but the basic calculation is always the same.
The state’s goal is to maximize revenue and the taxpayer’s goal is to pay as
little as possible. In this view, the differences in tax systems around the world
and the explanation for different rates of tax compliance are essentially a
product of the different bargains that have been struck between adversaries.3
In this book we tell a different story. In our view, in the more successful
societies people’s willingness to comply with tax authorities transcends the
ability of rulers to extract resources from their citizens and has much to do
with other variables such as culture, trust, fairness, and social cohesiveness.
Formal institutions are important, but they are only part of the story.
Promoting positive social norms
As we have seen in the “Willing to Pay?” experiments, there are a number
of motivations that affect individuals’ compliance decisions, just as there are a
wide range of individuals in every country (see Andrighetto et al. 2016;
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/6/2018, SPi
Taxation and Consent: Implications for Developing Nations
275
D’Attoma, Volintiru, and Steinmo 2017; Zhang et al. 2016; as well as the
forthcoming volume Willing to Pay?). To be sure, even in countries such as
Sweden some people still cheat the taxman (and maybe even steal from their
neighbors), while in countries such as Romania or Italy many people abide by
tax laws even when they know there are many others who do not. In all
societies there are those who will act according to what they think is “right”
(or fair, or just, or equitable, or even altruistic) even when a cost–benefit
analysis should lead them in the opposite direction. Finally, a large share of
people in any society will try to adjust their behavior to what they believe is
expected within that society—the social norms (Bicchieri 2006; Conte and
Andrighetto 2013; Elster 1989; Tetlock 2000; Traxler 2010).
This is where institutions become important. Institutions (both formal and
informal) are rule systems. High compliance societies have more efficient and
coherent institutions that signal and monitor desired behaviors or choices in
clear and transparent ways. Low compliance societies have unstable and less
efficacious institutions that neither give clear signals nor effectively monitor
the behavior of their members. In a society in which violating social rules or
laws is rarely punished, people will begin to defect. The more people who
defect, the more others will mold their behavior in the same way and eventu-
ally defection itself may become the norm (Andrighetto et al. 2013). When a
critical mass of defectors is built, it becomes extremely difficult to reverse this
equilibrium (Bergman 2009).
This overlooked aspect of taxation has important implications for the
enforcement capacities of states. A key reason that Italy cannot replicate the
tax administration of Sweden today is because of the large number of self-
employed individuals. The self-employed are harder to monitor and more
likely to cheat on their taxes everywhere (Gerxhani and Scham 2006; Pisani
2014). Large numbers of small companies and self-employed individuals (who
mostly work within a cash economy) make it exceptionally difficult to moni-
tor effectively these millions of taxpayers. Consequentially, nearly everyone
in Italy knows someone who under-reports their real income. For example, it
is commonplace in Italy for medical doctors and dentists to offer their
patients’ two prices: one price if you pay in cash and a higher one if you
need a receipt. Eventually this behavior becomes “normal.”
Similar stories are found throughout Latin American countries, where per-
sonal income tax is largely evaded (Barreix, Benítez, and Pecho 2017; Ondetti
2015) as well as in Africa (Kedir 2014). On the other hand, Sweden can achieve
high rates of compliance in part because for most people taxes are automatic-
ally reported and paid by employers. But compliance is also high in Sweden
because Swedes themselves monitor for the state. Not only are all citizens’ tax
reports available online, but also it is virtually unthinkable that a medical
doctor, for example, would offer a patient different prices according to
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whether they would like a receipt or not. In fact, Sweden is increasingly
becoming a cashless economy. As a consequence, tax authorities need only
identify a few tax evaders to maintain a positive equilibrium. Where monitor-
ing is extensive and administration is consistent, norms are easily reinforced.
Conversely, where many taxpayers can effectively hide income from the
authorities and few are caught, evasion has become a socially acceptable
norm—at least among large segments of society.
In sum, compliance co-evolves with efficient administration, effective insti-
tutions, and a society in which most people believe that everyone is paying
their fair share. Even self-employed people can be encouraged to higher levels
of compliance, but this requires states to firmly develop the necessary institu-
tional foundations. Brute deterrence will ultimately get mediocre results. Strong
states can generate high revenues at lower cost because their citizens are willing
to cooperate and even monitor each other. This kind of relationship is not
easy to develop, of course. As we have repeated often in this volume, “Getting
to Sweden” is hard. But the key point here is that this relationship must be
built upon socially cooperative foundations, not on threats and intimidation.
Building a sense of identity and/or purpose
Humans have a profound and natural motivation to belong (Axelrod 1986;
Baumeister 2011; Elster 1989). In this book we have seen multiple cases where
state actions have created a sense of belonging and/or helped facilitate a sense
that the state and society have a common purpose. Where this happens,
citizens are more willing to pay taxes.
Studies in tax compliance have very rarely explored the effect of social
cohesion in taxation. Still, the apparent correlation between cohesive societies
and levels of tax compliance should not be surprising. In the laboratory we
have found that compliance is higher as the group gets smaller. In general one
can say that smaller groups increase the level of interpersonal trust and thus
the levels of contribution to the common good are higher. More broadly, it
seems clear that societies capable of constructing a widely shared national
narrative are more able to demand sacrifices from their citizens. Most obvi-
ously, in periods of war, national disasters, or external threats, people’s will-
ingness to pay taxes increases.
Cohesiveness is of course a social construction. Cohesiveness is not the same
thing as homogeneity. The United States, after all, has been since its inception
a highly diverse country, with immigrants from all around the world, which
enforced slavery until the middle of the nineteenth century. Still, as we saw in
Carolyn C. Jones’s analysis (Chapter 9 in this volume), this country managed
tomanufacture a sense of identity and common purpose in themid-twentieth
century.
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There are no a priori salient natural traits that make one country more
cohesive than another. Social cohesiveness can stem from, for example, iso-
lation, from sharing common goals, from shared beliefs and/or religion, from
shared social mores, or from external threats. Smaller groups have a natural
tendency to be more cohesive but it is not a prerequisite.4
In Latin America, the two countries with the highest compliance rates are
Uruguay and Chile, which are among the most cohesive countries in the
region, while Mexico and Brazil (despite having strong tax administrations)
exhibit relatively high levels of non-compliance (CEPAL 2016). Central
American countries with deep social divisions such as El Salvador and Guate-
mala collect very little tax revenue while Costa Rica and to some extent
Panama have only moderate levels of tax evasion. Here too we see that Latin
American countries where people feel they truly belong to a national narrative
and common purpose enjoy better rates of tax compliance.
Political considerations also play a role in cohesiveness. Lieberman (2003)
has shown that South Africa’s elite racial coordination in the first half of the
twentieth century allowed it to command great tax sacrifices from its mem-
bers, whereas in Brazil elite regional fragmentation inhibited the emergence of
an upper-class sense of purpose and common identity. As a result, whites in
South Africa were able to raise significant tax revenues and compliance, while
Brazil lagged significantly behind in that respect.
Building Fiscal Legitimacy
The famous Allegory of the Good and Bad Government painted by Lorenzetti
located in the city councillors’ room of Siena’s fourteenth-century City Hall
has been seen as a masterpiece of what constitutes good governance. One of
the few texts included with the paintings clearly says that a governor can
collect taxes and tributes because he has promoted justice and fairness.5 In
this painting we see that even as far back as Middle Ages Italy, it was under-
stood that it was the obligation of the state to promote the common good (ben
commune) through fairness and justice.
In this section of our chapter we will explicitly explore how and why some
cases turn toward what we will call “virtuous circles”while others appear stuck
in “vicious cycles”. First, successful states produce tangible goods. Second, they
distribute those goods and raise revenues fairly. Fairness, as we shall see, can be
a rather complex concept in which both procedural justice and equity matter.
Third, in order for the state to be perceived as fair it must be able to monitor its
citizens and enforce its laws. Under these conditions, and perhaps only these
conditions, society itself may promote norms of cooperation and cohesion.
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Good government, then, can produce a positive feedback loop that may allow
the strong state to speak softly even while they may still carry a big stick.
Lennart Wittberg of the Swedish Tax Authority captures the dynamic in
this way:
There are also indirect effects of trust that may have a larger meaning. Most
taxpayers are willing to do right if others do. A belief that the tax administration
has the ability to ensure that others pay the right tax is therefore of great import-
ance for their own will to do the right thing. Another indirect effect is that trust
contributes to perceived justice, which in turn affects behavior.
(Wittberg 2010, authors’ translation)
We have seen several routes through which this process could happen, includ-
ing increasing taxes on workers in Sweden in the 1930s and 1940s; lowering
taxes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the UK; and even propa-
gandizing citizens as the country mobilized for war in the 1940s in the US. In
each of these successful cases, governments made a case which either con-
nected taxpayers and taxpaying to collective benefits and/or used tax and
compliance as a focal point for social solidarity.
The case histories in this volume have also given us several examples in
which the state was far less successful in building consent—or perhaps did not
even really try. As Clara Volintiru and Arpad Todor each demonstrated in their
chapters (10 and 11, respectively) on Romanian history, the Romanian state
never built a sense that the citizens belonged together or that the state was an
agent of society. Instead the state was seen as a foreign institution at first
dominated literally by foreign powers and then later dominated by alien and
hostile dictators. Though a variety of different tax collection mechanisms
were tried none of these proved effective at convincing Romanians that they
and their states had common identities or interests. Todor’s work demon-
strates that even the move toward a very low, flat-rate tax in the twentieth
century could not break this cycle, not because a foreign power still ruled
over Romania, but because the state itself was considered a hostile and
predatory force.
Italy offers an analogous, if not quite as extreme, example. Here the state
was dominated by foreign rulers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
But in this case it appears that it was internal fragmentation that weakened
Italy’s ability to come together and develop a sense of common purpose. First,
as Hien shows (Chapter 4), the Catholic Church did much to undermine the
legitimacy of the modern Italian state. But as John D’Attoma also shows
(Chapter 5), the continued conflicts between North and South have done
nothing but exacerbate these problems. Still today the state and its adminis-
trative apparatus are burdened by rules, laws, and legal protections that
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prevent the administration—and specifically its tax collectors—from building
the coherent administrative tools like those we have seen in Britain, Sweden,
and the United States.
Alexander Gershenkron’s famous essay, Economic Backwardness in Historical
Perspective (1962), argues that countries that entered the modern era relatively
late can be advantaged by the fact that in late development capital and labor
resources can be concentrated in ways that make it possible for them to
leapfrog past the early developers (Germany and Japan are the primary
examples). The logic here is that late developers could import the institutions,
economic structures, and technologies developed outside their country and
refine them to suit their local circumstances in sometimes very efficient ways.
Consequently, they quickly start up and enter global markets while maintain-
ing relatively low wages and thereby gain competitive advantage and even
overtake more established political economies (Gershenkron 1962).
The narratives found in this book and elsewhere lead one to suspect that the
advantages of importing administrative technologies are not always so obvi-
ous. The Romanian case provides perhaps the best example of this. In their
desperate desire to attain revenue efficiency and greater levels of effectiveness
after the fall of Communism, Romanian governments introduced one of the
most “advanced” andmodern tax systems in the world. The idea of a “flat tax”
system was at the cutting edge of economic thinking of the day. As we saw in
several countries examined here, by the mid-1980s the highly progressive and
highly complex tax systems that had developed over the previous fifty years
throughout Western democracies have been brought into question. Even
the Swedes had moved away from the very high marginal tax rates toward a
more “efficient” tax system. A number of Eastern European countries including
the Romanians took this idea one step further and introduced a flat (16 percent)
tax, the logic being that if it were so low everyonewould bewilling to pay. As we
learned in Todor’s chapter, things did not work out exactly as planned. Why?
The answer seems to be that simply introducing new technologies requires
an administrative and social foundation in which those technologies (whether
tax policy or something else) could and would be administered fairly and
efficiently. In other words, imposing a flat tax without first having developed
efficient monitoring systems for controlling the misbehavior of political and
administrative elites did nothing to build the legitimacy of the system as
a whole.
The most important lesson here is that leapfrogging usually fails because it
does not establish the social and administrative foundations for building
consent. Institutions need to perform effectively for the equilibrium to emerge
and be sustained. Many countries in the developing world are able to raise tax
revenues, yet they are still unable to foster voluntary compliance, and there-
fore they fall short of generating sustainable, cost-effective systems. The early
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state-building project inCentral America, for example, rejected tax progressivity
and fairness (Schneider 2012). The interests of economic privileged groups
were instead protected and this led to the belief that the system was unfair.
The result has clearly been to produce weak taxation regimes despite the fact
that these countries emulated similar tax structures promoted by inter-
national organizations. The post-Communist regimes in Ukraine, Russia,
and to some extent Poland, were able to exert coercion and improve tax
administrative capacities during the transition to market economies, but so far
they have fallen short of building the kind of institutions that enhance trust
and equity (Berenson 2017). In all these cases, the virtuous circles of compliance,
trust in governments, and valuable public goods has not yet been established.
Clever tax policies and large bureaucracies donot replace solid social institutions.
Countries that have long histories of adverse relationships between citizens
and their governors face difficulties in raising taxes. This is obvious. What
has received less attention is that building a “culture prone to compliance”
can take generations. Quick fixes rarely work. Of course, Guatemala cannot
be Sweden, but what Guatemala’s officers can do is learn from Sweden’s
sixteenth-century experience: building the foundations of a monitoring sys-
tem through the co-opting of strong groups (in Sweden’s case the Lutheran
Church) in order to foster mechanisms of compliance. Guatemala does not
need to wait a hundred years to enhance compliance; it can be done in amuch
shorter time span. Yet it still may be amatter of decades or generations before a
new culture of compliance fully emerges.
Lessons Learned
The historical narratives contained in this volume describe how “ecologies of
compliance” (or non-compliance) were construed and evolved over time. In
all of the 180+ countries in the world today only a tiny handful have achieved
anything like the kind of willing compliance we see in Scandinavia in the
twenty-first century. Indeed, one might say that even Italy (one of the less
successful countries in this study) is significantly better at generating tax
revenue than many other countries across the developing world. This section
examines what states can do to bolster the foundations for successful compliance:
building consent.
Monitoring
Several chapters in this book have demonstrated that consent is built on
effective monitoring and measuring mechanisms being in place before a
heavy tax burden is imposed. In Sweden, for example, because the cadastral
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system was established very early and effectively, the state and the local
community developed the capacity to monitor both those who paid taxes
and those who did not. As a consequence, the state developed the ability to
enforce rules broadly and relatively effectively. In the Italian and Romanian
cases, in contrast, the state failed to develop institutions that couldmonitor its
citizens and/or taxpayers effectively. Consequently, many taxpayers defected.
This is not because Italians or Romanians are more dishonest than Swedes
(Andrighetto et al. 2016). Rather, it is because Italian and Romanian institu-
tions differentiated between groups and regions in such a way that nearly
everyone felt that the system was unfair. The result has been a norm of non-
compliance.
In countries where tax evasion is prevalent, even good tax laws cannot
mitigate the adverse effect of the wide predisposition of citizens to cheat.
Citizens can effectively cooperate together to evade the state. In these cases
the vicious cycle of non-compliance and ineffective tax authority is hard
to break.
What is perhaps most remarkable about the Swedish case is that the state
relied on local parishes and church officers to collect the necessary informa-
tion. Rather than rely on a strongly hierarchical public administration, the
king devolved recording and reporting duties to local parishes, which had
direct knowledge of local taxpayers, and allowed them to run tax collection.6
In other words, tax capacities were developed in conjunction with non-state
actors in order to first guarantee the ability to monitor taxpayers and promote
fair application since inception.
Other countries took different routes but kept a similar logic: They built
capacity to gather information first and then applied the law in such a way
that government was perceived as fair. As Daunton shows, England also
developed the ability to monitor taxpayers at the parish level with the specific
aim of building consent. Similarly, the American state was in a somewhat
unique position because as the nation expanded across the continent the
government developed sophisticated administrative and technical expertise
to monitor and measure the nation. Later in the twentieth century it devel-
oped strong administrative capacities in the Internal Revenue Service, which
then propagandized citizens with a key unifyingmessage (taxes to fight Axis).7
In many societies people are afraid of the state. Consequentially, the state’s
ability to monitor its citizens or even their financial records is legally limited.
In several cases this could be for good historical reasons. Still, if the state does
not have the capacity to effectively monitor its citizens it cannot deliver the
goods and services, or tax citizens in ways that people feel are fair. There can be
no doubt that the enormous amount of information the British, Swedish, and
American tax authorities have about their citizens puts them light years ahead
of their Italian and Romanian counterparts. This may feel intrusive to those
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whom the tax authorities audit, but the fact that the state can do these things
means that other citizens can be relatively confident that laws are being
abided by and those that should pay, do pay.
Enforcement
Under the classical tax compliance paradigm that evolved from Allingham
and Sandmo (1972), enforcement is simply about deterrence. According to
this view, self-interested individuals want to maximize rents and therefore
they will cheat on taxes unless the perceived probabilities of detection and/or
punishment are high.
In our view, this misses the key point about compliance: We generally pay
taxes in private, for benefits that are public (Downs 1957). Tax compliance is
both a private and a public act because we are social animals who are strongly
motivated by social norms. In short, we are more willing to pay if we believe
that everyone (or nearly everyone) is paying as well. This is why enforcement
is so important. Taxpayers want to know that others are also contributing to
the collective, and most citizens will abide by the rules to the extent that they
believe that such an environment is maintained. In other words, the main
function of solid enforcement is not to intimidate the taxpayer into paying
taxes, but is instead to help convince citizens that everyone pays and thereby
build high tax morale (Wittberg 2010; 2012). Enforcement thus serves first
and foremost a social purpose: the creation of “ecologies” of compliance that
help people believe that cheats will be caught and punished. Taxpayers need
to see that cheats are detected and punished, and that the tax administration
is efficient and applies the laws and regulations fairly. Only under these
conditions will a culture of compliance prosper.
Once again, individuals are not purely rational estimators of gains and
losses. Instead, people anchor expectations on what a social norm dictates.
Therefore, whenmany people cheat (Italy, Romania), that will be the expected
behavior. Poor enforcement reproduces these perceptions, and the vicious
cycles are hard to break. When a norm emerges (a new tax or a new rule) the
state must make sure that most people adhere to it and they will aggressively
enforce the norm. Then, when most people already comply, moderate
enforcement will maintain the equilibrium. Successful states exert strong
enforcement at the outset of a new law and then apply selective andmoderate
enforcement to guarantee sustained cooperation.
Equity/fairness
Human beings show strong preferences for equity and fairness in the labora-
tory and in the real world alike (Bowles and Polanía-Reyes 2012; Fehr 2006;
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Kastlunger et al. 2011; Nicolaides 2014). Simply put, states that promote
equity and fairness have higher compliance rates. Fairness, to be sure, has
multiple meanings or interpretations. First, fairness in taxation means that
individuals will be more likely to comply if they believe they will be treated
equally with others to whom they could reasonably be compared (this is called
horizontal equity). Second, the vast majority of taxpayers everywhere believe
that the rich should pay higher taxes than the poor—taxes should be built on
the ability to pay (this is called vertical equity). Finally, the state should apply
its rules equally to all citizens (this is called procedural justice) (Kumlin 2002;
Rothstein 2000; 2011).
It may seem obvious, but it is important to note that rulers cannot foster
compliance environments where corruption is rampant. No one wants to
be a sucker (Levi 1988) and if citizens view elites as tax evaders, there is little
reason for them to willingly comply. As Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko
noted in his first State of the Nation address in June 2015: “The image of
the state is formed in citizens’ eyes by the tax inspector, the customs man,
the cop. While they’re on the take, people won’t believe the sincerity of
our anti-corruption intentions” (cited in Berenson 2017). We concur and
argue that without a strong and independent prosecution office and zero
tolerance against corruption, a tax compliance environment will be hard to
establish. Chile and Singapore are good examples, demonstrating how low
levels of corruption correlate with low levels of tax evasion. Conversely, the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Mexico have both high corruption and significant
tax evasion.
Citizens’ perceptions of fairness matter precisely because tax compliance is
not a simple tit-for-tat game. Instead of being a direct exchange, as in the
market, where I only pay for the things I can own, touch, or see, citizens often
pay for things that they personally do not want and cannot use. When
individuals believe that governments are producing goods that are fairly
distributed, this perception can produce more willingness to pay regardless
of whether they personally receive the benefits. For example, people are
willing to pay for pensions as long as mature adults receive adequate benefits,
and most people are willing to pay for children’s education even if they have
no children of their own.8 In short, the social perception that taxes are
converted into shared social equity can transcend the short-term self-interest
paradigm. As social creatures, people also care for the common well-being.9
In order to foster a fair system, taxes should target a large taxpayer base, be
general, and be widely applied. Unfortunately, too many governments in
need of resources look for quick revenues usually raised among those who
cannot escape enforcement (bank deposits, certain transactions, imports and
exports controlled by customs, gasoline taxes, and so on). In our view, this is a
sure recipe for failure down the road. People who pay taxes should not feel
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they are victims or just the unlucky ones. Fairness is gained when those who
pay believe that the tax authorities go the extra mile to tax those who cheat.
In summary, states can enhance compliance if they build their tax systems
fairly. Fairness in taxation has several dimensions: It implies: (1) that tax rates
are proportionate to the level of income or the ability to pay (progressivity);
(2) that people are treated equally; and (3) that rights are granted to the
individuals (including courts and institutions) that protect these rights (procedural
fairness).
Recommendations for Policies
We conclude with an even narrower andmore specific set of recommendations
that are drawn from the lessons learned in this book as well as the five-year
“Willing to Pay?” investigation funded by the European Research Council.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, our recommendations overlap with many ideas and
policies that have been promoted by several international organizations includ-
ing the IMF,World Bank, andOECD.Our emphasis, however, is less on revenue
collection from a technical perspective and instead focuses on measures
intended to build stronger relationships between taxpayers and tax authorities.
We do not suggest that all these policy ideas could be implemented at any one
time, but rather that they are goals that we believe would contribute to building
better relationships between citizens and their states. Ironically, perhaps, they
also imply that measures should be taken that are specifically designed to be—
or are dependent upon—stronger states.
The following is essentially a list of several policy guidelines derived from
the lessons of this project. By no means do we cover the full range of tax
policies that should be considered, nor dowe suggest that all of thesemeasures
can or should be implemented at once. These are guidelines governments may
benefit from, and that have been somewhat overlooked in the literature. We
instead list them and make very brief remarks, as they are clearly tied to the
central theme of those books.
• Strong information systems. This should be top priority. States should
develop tools to monitor the incomes and transactions of individuals
and corporations both within and outside their national borders. There-
fore, tax administration should have access to other information systems
such as welfare programs, credit cards, and financial transactions, and
invest heavily in capabilities to identify them with taxpayers. Of course
they should be used very restrictively to protect individual rights.
• Build third party payment/information systems. Successful tax policies
combine taxpaying and tax information requirements. Large taxpayers,
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employers, corporations, banks, and so on are agents that can provide
useful information to the state. Successful cases have shown that compli-
ance increases dramatically when these steps are successfully implemented.
• Permanently develop monitoring capacities to signal to taxpayers that the tax
agency knows a great deal about income and financial transactions. Tax
administrators in large non-compliance societies should privilege wide
monitoring over audit policies. Effective monitoring has wide coverage of
taxpayers, while tax audits reach very few taxpayers and are usually
ineffective in reducing the number of tax evaders. Italy probably audits
more taxpayers, but Sweden and Britain have higher compliance rates.
• Invest heavily to improve cadastral records. Property taxes are very progres-
sive but they are widely evaded in the developing world. Therefore, an
important element in producing legitimacy and fairness is to have a
strong property tax. States need to coordinate politically with local gov-
ernments, which usually levy such taxes; not an easy task.
• Ensure simplicity. Complexity breeds evasion. Only levy taxes that can be
enforced. Many taxpayers, given the chance to cheat, will do so, even in
Sweden. Two variables make the difference in compliance between coun-
tries: (1) withholding andmonitoring mechanisms; and (2) the individual’s
willingness to takehigh risks andcheat. Firstly, policies shouldpromote taxes
that are: “compliance friendly”—that is, easy to report, those withheld at
source or through a third party, such asVAT; income taxes based onmultiple
information requirements readily available to the taxadministrationagency;
and property taxes based on accurate land and property registers.
• Make everyone pay something. This is a critical point, particularly in the
developing world where a significant share of citizens is exempt from
personal direct taxes. However, to guarantee fairness and inclusion, and
to make demands for state effectiveness, all people should contribute.
When everybody pays, people feel included. This means that even the poor
should pay something. This might be controversial, but as derived from
other principles, membership to a community should cost something. Of
course, progressivity should be strictly maintained.
• Start with the rich (they should pay dividends) and monitor your borders. This is
critical, since the middle class through fudging and evasion, and the rich
through legal exemption, avoid paying a significant share of their income.
All taxation success stories began by taxing the rich and slowly expanding
toward the middle class. Countries should not be afraid of capital flight,
because the costs of not taxing the rich in the long run are higher. Devel-
oping countries might benefit from cooperation with OECD countries
and international organizations in closing tax havens and promoting
cooperation with countries for releasing financial information. Large
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sums of tax-evaded funds from the rich are hidden in banks and assets in
OECD countries, as well as in tax havens.
• Punish severely and consistently. Send to prison dozens or even hundreds
of tax evaders per year. Do not settle disputes with reduced fines, because
they incentivize tax evaders. This does not mean that the state only relies
on “the stick” to enhance compliance. The main purpose is to signal to
compliers that cheats are severely punished, promoting fairness in taxation.
• Be uncompromising with corruption. Corruption is perhaps one of the
most corrosive factors in compliance behavior. It unravels trust, fair-
ness, and equality. Authorities should send a message that corruption
will not be tolerated, despite the fact that initially many agents and
taxpayers will be willing to take bribes. Corruption probably will not
be completely eliminated, but citizens will know that governments are
not complacent.
• Take as many steps as possible to reduce the cash economy. Informal econ-
omies augment individual incentives to cheat. Temporary reliefs gained
through tolerating informal markets tend to undermine development
and also tax compliance. Countries with low compliance equilibria tend to
produce dual economies or at least large informalmarkets that have perverse
effects and, due to the social cost, are hard to reverse.
• Fiscal balance matters, but people will comply if they feel they receive valuable
goods in exchange. This is critical for the developing world. The story of
Britain, Sweden, and the USA has shown that taxes need to be shown
promoting the public good. Paying off national debts might prevent
financial crisis but citizens do not perceive this as beneficial. Taxes should
produce clear and tangible public goods, either in infrastructure, educa-
tion, and/or healthcare services, or to fight wars or expel a threat to the
country’s security.
• Raise taxes in good times. Taxes enacted in prosperous times can produce
public goods that enhance wide compliance, nurturing a virtuous circle.
Conversely, taxes promoted under crisis might be necessary but most
likely they will be quick fixes and not long-term solutions. If governments
are forced to raise taxes to alleviate a specific need, they should reduce
them once the goal has been attained. Britain in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries raised taxes during wars, but returned to previous
levels afterwards.
• VAT should not be the only or most important tax although it should be
promoted or kept. VAT has been the workhorse of tax systems in the
developing world because it effectively creates incentives for compliance.
Tax authorities should take steps to include the informal economy
(through withholdings, reporting, and low rates) into the VAT base.
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Conclusion
No one should take these policy ideas and suggestions as absolutemaxims that
must be applied in any and every case. Indeed, as the historical chapters in this
volume demonstrate quite clearly, there are many routes to a modern, effi-
cient, and successful tax system. Surely, the Swedish example continues to be
a model that could be emulated, but no one should be so naïve as to believe
that the Swedish story could be repeated or copied in full. Still, the central
points that can be drawn from the Swedish (as well as the British and American
cases) in contrast to the Italian and Romanian examples are that consent is
contingent on four basic factors which may seem obvious, but are worth
repeating here: (1) the state must develop the capacity to monitor its citizens
and lands in order to administer taxes in ways that citizens can consider to be
fair; (2) citizens are far more “willing to pay” when they see that they get
something in return for the taxes they pay, and that other citizens pay their
share; (3) tax revenues finance public programs and institutions that contrib-
ute to greater social justice and equality, but a punitive tax system which
pretends to tax the rich, but then allows them to evade, generates little
revenue butmuch skepticism toward the state; (4) themore successful regimes
have been able to raise taxes while creating a common sense of identity or
purpose.
Governments across the world today are under great pressure to finance
public programs, improve infrastructure, and satisfy citizens’ expectations.
Too often though, taxes are used as sticks to herd the taxpayers into compli-
ance and/or discriminate between different groups in society. When they do
so, the state is more likely to be seen as a predator than as an agent. In this
case, few taxpayers will be willing to take the Leap of Faith.
Notes
1. A note from Sven Steinmo: As I was coming toward the end of this large project on
tax compliance in (mostly) developed nations I grew increasingly interested in
thinking about the implications of this research for the developing world. Surely,
the routes followed (some obviously more successfully than others) should have
some implications for countries which have not yet been able to build sustainable
and efficient tax systems? I had recently read the marvelous book, Tax Evasion and
the Rule of Law in Latin America, by Marcelo Bergman (2009) and had been deeply
impressed with this book generally and its obvious links to many of the arguments
we have been developing in our European Research Council-funded project. To this
end I invited Professor Bergman to collaborate withme on the concluding chapter of
this book. My idea here was to see if it would be possible to move from the study of
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several historical cases to explicitly examining their implications for quite different
countries who very often are struggling now with issues confronted by the more
advanced countries decades and perhaps even centuries ago. Especially given the
fact that this book will be available “Open Access” to anyone in the world with
an Internet connection, we take the somewhat unusual step of moving from history
to policy. Of course, it will be up to the reader to decide whether this was a wise
move or not.
2. Marc Berenson offers a fascinating comparison of tax policies and compliance in
which he makes almost exactly this point. He introduces his book with the follow-
ing: “Effective governance occurs when the state and society interact with each
other in a dualistic process through trust” (Berenson 2017: 2). We strongly recom-
mend this book to those interested in a similar analysis to that found here, but
particularly to those interested in the implications for the post-Communist world.
3. Levi indeed recognizes the importance of what she calls quasi-voluntary compliance
that is contingent to both the exchange equity (she fully develops this dimension)
and horizontal fairness (making sure that others pay). However, she does not really
extend the implications of this last dimension, probably because hers is a top-down
theory, while we promote an endogenous equilibrium, a co-evolving approach.
4. A comparison between Rwanda and Burundi provides a fascinating example. Both
countries have been torn apart due to ethnic conflict and violence. Yet, Rwanda
today is noted for having one of the most effective and efficient tax administrations
and highest level of tax compliance in the developing world. Burundi, in contrast,
continues to suffer from an inability to provide coherent administration and gov-
ernance. A consequence is very low tax compliance (Bank 2010; Tumwebaze 2013).
5. The text within the lower border of the image reads: “This holy virtue [Justice],
where she rules, induces to unity the many souls [of citizens], and they, gathered
together for such a purpose, make the Common Good their Lord; and he, in order to
govern his state, chooses never to turn his eyes from the resplendent faces of the
Virtues who sit around him. Therefore to him in triumph are offered taxes, tributes,
and lordship of towns; therefore, without war, every civic result duly follows—
useful, necessary, and pleasurable.”
6. Several countries around the world today are experimenting with various versions of
“tax farming” in which non-state actors (usually for-profit businesses) are tasked
with collecting revenues for the state (Stella 1993). The experiments are ongoing and
the results are mixed. In addition, the wide range of withholding systems in income
tax and VAT are centered on this basic principle: Let employers or large firms collect
the lion’s share of the revenues, and have the tax administration concentrate on
controlling these large agencies and firms (Bird 1989: 232–6).
7. Tax capacities therefore are closely linked to the information systems that govern-
ments develop. As Jones’s paper shows for the USA, a key element for successful
compliance rates has been the W-2 form that employers file for each employee,
enabling the IRS to gather information.
8. In Latin America a deep sense of injustice and inequality has hindered the ability of
governments to make progressive tax reforms and elicit fair tax regimes (Mahon,
Bergman, and Arnson 2015). Elites are hesitant to support redistributive systems
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even when they have mustered strong political capacity (Ondetti 2015). In general,
whether there are low legal tax burdens, such as in Mexico and Chile, or mass
evasion and corruption, such as in Brazil, taxpayers remain skeptical and defiant
about the ability of Latin American states to enhance fairness through fiscal policies,
and therefore compliance remains low in most countries.
9. Anthony Down’s (1960) classic essay, “Why Government’s Budget is too Small in a
Democracy,” presents the dilemma that citizens are less aware of the benefits they
receive from taxation (paved roads, clean air, public safety) than they are on the
direct costs of taxation. Consequentially, he argues, citizens overvalue the taxes they
pay considering the benefits they wish for. We take this point seriously, but taken
too far it ignores the point that many citizens are willing to pay for services and
goods that they do not directly benefit from if they believe these goods and services are
distributed fairly.
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